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AUTONOMY, GAY RIGHTS AND HUMAN SELFFULFILLMENT: AN ARGUMENT FOR MODIFIED
LIBERALISM IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
VINCENT J. SAMAR*

INTRODUCTION

In this article, I argue that public education should provide a
constructive forum for discussing aspects of lesbian and gay
lifestyles in both primary and secondary schools.' My argument is
that such action is necessary to offset the way the dominant culture
limits the capacities of gays and lesbians to achieve human selffulfillment. In making this argument, I recognize that I am going
beyond merely promoting social tolerance, often advocated by
liberals as the proper role of government, to legitimizing an actual
place for discussion of the needs and interests of gays and lesbians
in the society at large. Although I do not intend to confine this
article to the values of any one culture, I draw many of my examples
from American society, as I am more familiar with it than any other
society. Still, the principles I will apply to make this argument
will not strictly conform to nor contrast with standard American
constitutional interpretations. Indeed, because the principles
on which I rely are broad, they are not specifically situated in
legal philosophy (concerning the nature of law and its validation),
but rather, principles of normative political philosophy (concerning
ethical justifications of governmental institutions). A description of
the principles I have in mind is most prominently found in the
United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.' These
principles are generally applicable to liberal educational institutions
worldwide and meet American constitutional requirements, provided
that certain interpretative adjustments are recognized particularly
* Vincent J. Samar is Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago
and Oakton Community College, as well as Adjunct Professor of Law at Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author wishes to thank Mark Strasser for his
very helpful remarks to an earlier draft of this article, Christopher Lane for the cite to
Maurice, and Kevin Runlett for pointing out the "heckler's veto" in Palmore v. Sidoti.
1. I mean to include bisexual lifestyles here as well. As those involve combinations, with
varying degrees of accommodation of heterosexual and homosexual lifestyles, where the
former is already part of the dominant culture, I do not make separate reference to
bisexuality.
2. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration] cited in THE PRESIDEN'S
COMMISSION FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF HuMAN RIGHTS YEAR 1968, HUMAN RIGHTS.. .UNFOLDING
OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 98-106 (1968).
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in regard to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, the American constitutional system might be seen as an
example of how these principles generally can be instantiated to
constitutional democracies. Although the focus of this article will be
on publicly supported primary and secondary education, I also
envision that the principles applied would, as a matter of political
morality, have other applications and that this article may foster
discussions of their application to related areas of social discourse.4
Education provides the primary focus because of its ability to extend
human aspirations to their maximum and human capacities in
service to those aspirations.
The principles I will endorse support liberal education by
continuing to make openness to new ideas and different ways of
thinking a central value of public education. Nonetheless, I will not
be advocating the kind of multiculturalist position that would grant
almost every group, including gays and lesbians, an exemption from
certain portions of the curriculum that might offend them, especially
if the result may be that important aspects of their members'
individual identities are sacrificed in the process.5 The sense of
liberty that emerges will not be unconditioned. I will not be arguing
that public education should merely accept as equal any social
norms that may be alleged to underlie individual self-fulfillment.
I also take a position somewhat different from that of Brian

3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This raises an interesting liberty versus equality
question, because American First Amendment law generally requires that the state maintain
viewpoint neutrality when it comes to restricting freedom of speech. It prohibits restrictions
on speech from focusing on the viewpoint of the speaker. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 13 (1993). I am not arguing so much for restrictions on
speech as I am for the inclusion of a certain form of promotional speech. This distinction is
admittedly difficult to make. See id at 199-201. For a broader discussion of how the principles
that are used here might fit human rights laws generally, see Vincent J. Samar, Gay Rights
as a ParticularInstantiationofHuman Rights, 64 ALB. L. REV. 983 (2001).
4. For example, these principles might justify governmental financial sponsorship of
serious works of art and music by gays and lesbians, as well as state-provided information
about the contributions that these groups of people have made to the society at large. I also
envision government-provided information about the threats lesbians and gays confront from
social intolerance and inadequate health information, as with AIDS and other STDs. This
information could be provided as part of school curricula and in other appropriate educational
formats in which governmental support is necessary. I also envision a continuation of what
several communities have already begun in the form of public recognition, via parades and
other public events, of the contributions of gays and lesbians, and the enactment of hate
crimes and antidiscrimination laws, especially in areas of employment, housing and public
accommodations. Finally, I envision the extension of all laws benefiting heterosexuals, such
as laws regarding marriage and parenting, to lesbians and gays. Discussion of these issues
might become part of social science curricula.
5. See generally BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQuALrrY (2001).
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Barry in Culture andEquality,6 who argues that government should
neither grant exemptions to illiberal groups nor be focused on
promoting an ideal of autonomy in which individuals are
encouraged to question their basic beliefs and probe the institutions
and practices of where they live.' To the contrary, my position is
to endorse public schools taking an active role in supporting both
human freedom and well-being, in order to provide the conditions
upon which gays and lesbians can discover, for themselves, their
own identities and what is best for them.8 My definitions of 'human
freedom' and 'human well-being' follow those of Alan Gewirth,
who emphasizes with respect to freedom, the procedural conditions
that allow one to control his or her behavior by his or her own
unforced choice with knowledge of relevant circumstances and
with respect to well being, "the various substantive conditions and
abilities" necessary both to acting itself and to "achieving one's
purposes through one's action. For this reason, my view emphasizes
learning techniques of critical evaluation in addition to exposing
students to different kinds of cultural values that might lead to
various conceptions of the 'good life.' Indeed, it is this juxtaposition
of liberty and well being, as dually necessary to the effective
development ofhuman self-fulfillment, that warrants describing my
view as a modified form of liberalism and not mere social tolerance.
I am mindful of recent arguments by Barry and others that
show how often very sincere approaches to the protection of well
being, for example, in some views of multiculturalism, work to
undermine democratic principles and harm the very people that
they are supposed to benefit.' ° These effects occur, as Barry
correctly points out, only when illiberal subgroups are given
privileges that do not allow their members easy escape from the
obligations of membership." An example of this is when wellmeaning fundamentalist Christians are allowed to take their
children out of public schools and restrict the books that are read or
are available in the school library, in order to discourage the
6. Id. at 118-23.
7. In fact, Barry may believe in such an ideal, but he shies away from making it a
primary focus of government. See id. at 120.
8. I follow a point made by Joseph Raz, that "success and failure in the pursuit of our
goals is in itself the major determinant of our well-being." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 297 (1986). Conflicts between freedom and well-being are not theoretically
foreclosed, but neither are they of much concern for our purposes here.
9. ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 79-80 (1998) [hereinafter GEWIRTH, SELF-

FULFILMENT].
10. See BARRY, supra note 5, at 11.
11. Id. at 239-45.
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children from learning about alternative lifestyles, specifically
same-sex relationships. 2 It also occurs when public educational
authorities substitute cogent argumentation with 'politically correct'
ideals that label any counter argument as homophobic, racist, or
sexist before examining the merits of the arguments to show their
reliance on untrue, or partially true, stereotypes or other misleading
information. 13 Here, it seems too easy to use the argument that
everyone's voice must be given equal attention to dilute the very
valuable contributions gays and lesbians as a subcultural,
nonilliberal group make to their members' achievement of selffulfillment. Especially in cases where the mainstream culture is the
source of the illiberality, as is typical in the context of gender roles,
it is important for public education to affirm various positive
lifestyles to ensure that individuals are not prohibited from
discovering who they are or what they can achieve. Of course, this
raises an important question of what lifestyles get affirmed and on
what basis they are affirmed. This is a question that I will examine
more fully below.
By culture, I mean the total set of expressions including symbols,
rituals, practices (ways of performing certain recognized institutional
activities including marriage and even sporting activities), values,
forms of dress, and styles of belief that define a particular group of
human beings. I take this to be an anthropological notion of culture,
as distinguished from a humanist notion that treats culture as the
best that humans can obtain. 4 The latter notion can provide a
12. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing the Amish to remove their
children from pubic schools after age fourteen in order to protect their traditional way of life).
Although not specifically directed to the same issues, Yoder provides a ground for other
parents to remove children from public schools to protect their cultural value systems.
13. Barry admits the need for such argument when it comes to showing a fallacy with the
multiculturalist position. See BARRY, supra note 5, at 274. Barry shies away from the state
taking "as its mission the inculcation of autonomy." Id. at 119. Perhaps, this is because he
sees the inculcation of autonomy, as it is sometimes professed, as exhibiting too little rigor.
See id. at 222-25. Barry also suggests that a well- educated person is one who, presumably
using rules of formal logic and evidence, is able to "recognize when they do not have an
adequate basis for having a view on a topic." Id. at 225. Society has an interest in producing
such persons. See id. at. 225-33.
14. Alan Gewirth distinguishes an anthropological concept of culture from the humanistic
concept. The former is "a way of life as it is understood, symbolized, and evaluated by the
group that lives it; it is a set of both group practices and of related beliefs." The latter is a
normative concept, which in Michael Arnold's definition, is "a pursuit of our total perfection
by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has
been thought and said in the world." See GEWIT, SELF-FuLFnILENT, supr note 9, at 12829 (citing MICHAEL ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 6 (1960) As will become clear, I employ
the former notion to set out the conflicts that may arise between a dominant culture and
various subcultures and the latter concept to say what ultimately should be done to resolve
these conflicts.
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normative ground for assessing the former and need not be confined
to any specific time or place. However, the former provides a good
basis to begin as it lays the foundation of what is to be explored.
Using the anthropological notion, a dominant culture exists when
more than half the population within a given geographical location
pervasively accepts a particular set of expressions. By the same
token, a subculture exists when a particular subset of the population
(defined by some characteristic other than their deviation from
the dominant culture) shares a set of expressions not commonly
shared, or only shared to a limited extent, by the population at
large. 5 In this sense, the mere use of illicit drugs would not
constitute a subculture, although being identified by religion,
nationality, or ethnicity might. Subcultures can exist alongside a
dominant culture or, where no dominant culture exists, alongside
other subcultures, as we see in the aftermath ofthe dissolution of the
former Yugoslavian state.16 In this essay, I will approach this
anthropological notion of culture from within a human rights
('humanist cultural') perspective. It will thus treat gay and lesbian
individuals as identified by their sexual orientation, which is
distinct from the various lifestyles they may adopt for themselves.
Following this approach, gays and lesbians can be found to be both
part of the dominant culture and often part of various subcultural
groups as they seek to engage sometimes competing norms to
discover higher ordered goods. 7 In this sense, the humanist concept
of culture will dominate my approach, as it will place liberalism
ultimately on a foundation of autonomy (individual self-rule), in
which individuals can best determine, with proper training, what
will benefit their lives. It is important to understand that by
'autonomy,' I mean the conditions under which one acts in the
absence of outside constraints versus the nature of the action
(whether, for example, it is self-regarding or not). I recognize that
I may be accused of beginning this discussion from within a certain
Western cultural bias. This bias, to whatever extent it exists, will be
attenuated, as I show that the foundation for my position must
apply cross-culturally if human rights are to be truly preserved.
By giving a degree of respect and positive public support to
lesbians and gays, among others, public education may offset
mainstream cultural imperialism in a way it could not accomplish
15. ROGER PEARSON, ANTHROPOLOGICAL GLOSSARY 240 (1985).
16. In this instance, the cultures that exist side by side are in constant strife, and it is
unclear whether they will be able to overcome their mutual animosities.
17. By 'higher ordered goods,' I mean those goods that go beyond mere fulfillment of
desires to include what can add to the greatest benefit of all who seek them out.
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by strictly following a hands-off position on cultural change.'" In
this way, by not playing a neutral role, public education may
actually achieve a neutral result in revealing the variety of ways
individual self-expression and self-fulfillment can be obtained.
The fact that this may go against certain mainstream cultural
norms that advocate neutrality in education on matters that are
controversial is all the more reason for providing it, because
refraining from action is not a neutral act but an affirmation of the
cultural status quo. Here the task for the philosopher is not to
identify specific positive actions that public school officials should
take to provide a more enlightened education. That is best left to
teachers and educators who are likely to be better acquainted
with the means for bringing about a good liberal education. The
political philosopher's task, rather, must be to clarify the principles
for when a liberal society should break with the mainstream
culture's counter-liberal attitudes to affirm the needs of a subgroup
via an already established system of public education. It is also the
philosopher's task to establish limits on how far public education
should go in affirming the needs or interests of any given subcultural
group so as not to substitute one form of cultural imperialism for
another. Even though this means that public education will no
longer be 'neutral' in the viewpoints it affirms, provided those
viewpoints are based on rational and objective evidence, that should
not provide a reason for objection. 9
Section I of my discussion explores the ways mainstream
culture in Western countries, specifically the United States,
marginalizes gay and lesbian people. Section II discusses two
different approaches to liberalism in Western societies and their
respective limitations. Section III then provides an argument for
why human rights to freedom and well-being should be thought
to provide the baseline for all social interactions, including those
that affect one's capacity for self-fulfillment. Section IV considers
18. David McCabe's discussion of the writings of Joseph Raz notes that Raz believes that
"modern pluralistic societies are acculturated into the ideals of self-creation and selfauthorship that constitute autonomy" and that individuals in such societies "can have
successful lives only if they actually have access to the range of options necessary for
autonomy, and state intervention may be needed to ensure this." David McCabe, Joseph Raz
and the Contextual Argument for Liberal Perfectionism, 111 ETHMcs 493, 519 (2001) (citing
Joseph Raz, FacingUp: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.1153, 1229 n.162 (1989)).
19. I recognize that, at least in American society, one of the canons of First Amendment
constitutional jurisprudence is that government should always act with a neutral viewpoint
when it comes to restricting different forms of speech or recognizing different 'religions.'
However, as I attempt to show, when a dominant culture is anything but viewpoint neutral
on values that most directly affect individual self-fulfillment, a government stance that is
supposedly viewpoint-neutral is reallyjust government affirming the status quo.
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the impact of these human rights and cultural norms, that may be
incompatible with certain aspects of human self-fulfillment, on public
education. Finally, Section V considers how these principles might
dovetail with one particular democratic set of constitutional norms,
namely, the Equal Protection Clause. Through examination of this
legal principle, the essay will develop a fuller notion of autonomy
that public education should promote, in respect to certain gay and
lesbian lifestyles, especially within democratic societies that place
a high value on individual equality.
One important caveat needs to be mentioned. The subtitle of
this article is "A Modified Form of Liberalism in Public Education"
rather than "A Justified Exception to Liberalism to Promote Some
Gay and Lesbian Lifestyles via Public Education." The subtitle is
not inappropriate, even though the article is primarily focused on
the role of public education in promoting some gay and lesbian
lifestyles. Although the focus is on one particular subgroup of
society, the general structure of the argument could accommodate
other subgroups marginalized by the mainstream culture. Thus,
there is the sense that the exceptions swallow the rule, as the form
of liberalism that emerges could be used by many marginalized
subgroups, 0 with only minor changes, to reflect specific ways in
which the dominant culture excludes particular peoples from the
positive benefits that they would otherwise provide.
I. How WESTERN CULTURE MARGINALIZES GAY AND
LESBIAN PEOPLE

Cross-cultural comparisons of homosexuality show no consistent
approach to the way it is viewed or evaluated 21 any more than
they show a consistent approach to the way gender is viewed or
evaluated.' Even within Western culture, where science and social
20. For example, I expect that transgendered people, seeking to offset cultural biases
against their lifestyle changes, could make use of my arguments.
21. For example, there is little doubt that social expression of the Greek notion of man/boy
love is different from the modern expression of homosexual desire, especially in regard to age,
although the concept of people who experience same-sex desire appears to be the same in both
cases. See RICHARD MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIEs 233 (1992); see also
EVE SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 25 (1990) (mentioning thirteen different

ways to differentiate our ways of thinking about sexuality).
22. In her article, InterpretingGender, Linda Nicholson argues that feminists who fashion
theories about women's lives across large distances of culture and history fail to pay adequate
attention to where their generalizations break down. Whether to include Zuni berdache or
contemporary transsexuals among the victims of patriarchy, for example, is a political choice
not determined by some neutral biological or cultural description. See Linda Nicholson,
InterpretingGender, in RACE, CLASS, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: THE BIG QUESTIONS 205-08 (N.
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science play important educational roles, homosexuality is not
defined or evaluated consistently.2 For example, gays and lesbians
are identified in America and many European societies by their
sexual orientation.2 4 This means that they are identified by the
object of their sexual affections.2 5 In other societies, including some
in the West, whether someone is gay or lesbian is based on the role
performed in a sexual act, for example, whether the person acts as
an inserter or a recipient.2 6 At times, the machismo idea in some
Hispanic cultures operates in this way." But it is also the case that
sometimes, a person is labeled gay or lesbian without any specific
knowledge either about the object of his or her affection or the
sexual role performed. For example, if a male merely exhibits
effeminacy, he may be perceived as gay.28 If a female exhibits
masculinity, she may be perceived as lesbian.2 9 Such seeming
confusion of sexual orientation with stereotypical gender constructs
(in the past called 'inversion') follows a similar confusion between
sex and gender in Western culture, even though the former is
biological while the latter is a social construction.30 This confusion
not only results in misjudging those who are gay or lesbian, but also
illustrates broader social expectations about the social roles that
men and women generally are supposed to follow." The effect of a

Zack, et al. eds., 1998.). But see Susan Moller Okin,Gender Inequality and CulturalDifference,
in ETHICs: THE BIG QUESTIONS 427-30 (James Sterba, ed., 1998) (arguing that whatever other
differences may exist between women in different societies, certain problems are common and
along with them the possibility of common solutions).
23. See David Halperin, Saint Focault, in ETHICS: THE BIG QUESTIONS 261-64 (James
Sterba ed., 1998) (building on the work of Michel Foucault, arguing that scientific and cultural
debates about homosexuality show that homosexuality is a constructed phenomenon that is
often used to cover up contradictions in heterosexuality).
24. BARRY, supra note 5, at 96.
25. See EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY AND ETHICS
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 39-40 (1999); see also John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals and
Sexual Categories,in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 17-36,
postscript at 35 (Martin Duberman ed., 1989) (defining "gay persons" as "those whose erotic
interest is predominantly directed toward their own gender").
26. See STEIN, supra note 25,at 34-35.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 35.
30. See id. at 254-57 (discussing the possibility that there may be multiple origins for
sexual orientation that fit both a sophisticated natural kind model and various social
constructionist models). For a discussion of the distinction between gender and sex, see MOHR,
supra note 21, at 141.
31. See Patrick D. Hopkins, Gender Treachery:Homophobia,Masculinity,and Threatened
Identities, in RACE, CLASS, GENDER AND SEXUALITY 170-72 (Naomi Zack ed., 1998) (arguing
how individuals who do not conform to gender norms threaten the general system of rewards
for male status); Susan Wolf, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM 76-77 (Charles Taylor ed.,
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failure to live up to these expected social constructions and
consequently being labeled gay or lesbian, can have wider ranging
implications than just on how one perceives oneself.
Marginalization occurs through loss ofjob, family, friends, and
generally being socially ostracized. These are just a few of the more
common repercussions that the dominant culture inflicts on gays
and lesbians both in England and the United States. 2 In other
Western European cultures, the effects may be less severe."3 However,
they can be far more severe, including punishment by death, in nonWestern, particularly Islamic countries.3 4 Consequently, among those
for whom the label of being gay or lesbian has been correctly
attached, only some (even in the West) choose to adopt an openly
gay lifestyle." Those who are falsely labeled or who seek to hide the
truth of their gay sexual orientation, follow different strategies to
dispel the perception. Some adopt an overtly masculine or feminine
personae; others become ravenously homophobic. In each case,
however, it is self-identity that is being constrained by forces,
sometimes perceived and sometimes not, operating initially from
outside the self. 6 This constraint may not be just external. In cases
where the self has internalized the dominant culture's attitudes and
has begun to hate itself, the results can be quite devastating, often
leading to excessive use of drugs and alcohol and even suicide in the
most extreme cases.
In each case, one may find himself quite incomplete yet have no
clear view of how to improve. This generally occurs, because human
aspirations and capacities do not exist in a vacuum. A person's
awareness and ability to develop his capacities is usually part of
"existing social forms, i.e., on forms of behavior which are in fact

1994) (noting the positive and negative uses of gender roles in enhancing women's artistic,
intellectual, and professional abilities).
32. See, e.g., Elsa Brenner, The Invisible Population,The Gays Next Door, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1999, at 14WC1; Stephen A. Holmes, Clinton Backs Bill to ProtectHomosexualsfrom
Job Bias, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at Al; Edward Tivnan, Homosexuals and the Churches,
N. Y. TIMES, OcT. 11, 1987, at 14; see also, DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
HOMosEXuALrTY 455-58 (discussing the repression of homosexuals).
33. See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, British, UnderEuropeanCourtRuling, End Ban on Openly Gay
Soldiers, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al; Terence Neilan, Germany: Making Amends to
Gays, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at A12; Sheila Rule, Rights for Gay Couples in Denmark,
N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at A8.
34. See STEIN, supra note 25, at 284.
35. See, e.g., E.R. Shipp, Homosexual Lawyers Keep Fighting Barriers,N. Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3,
1989, at Bl; BeingAccepteik Gay Students Attend a Prom, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989, at 47.
36. MORRIS B. KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC CTIZENSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF
DESIRE 32 (1997) (arguing that "the culture is infused with attitudes that support the active
discouragement if not the complete prohibition of lesbian and gay intimacies and identities").
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widely practiced in his society."37 These social forms thus affect all
of our important life pursuits including careers, leisure activities,
aesthetic experience, and personal relationships. Because awareness
and ability are often embodied with various myths and images
drawn from the broader culture, they are partially dependent on
the way the values of that broader culture are interpreted and
incorporated by the self. This potentially places a very serious
burden on gay or lesbian persons choosing to come out of the closet.
To the gay or lesbian individual, coming out might signal an
acceptance of the negative myths and images, which consequently
becomes their outlook on themselves, their pursuits, and even on
their own self-worth. Indeed, this translation may lead them to
adopt a kind of cruel anti-liberal self-hatred towards themselves, as
a result of the dominant culture's prescription.3 8
As this article is being written, the dominant culture is in flux
on gay and lesbian acceptance. Within the last two years, both the
United States Senate and House of Representatives passed an
amendment to the Education Bill that cuts off federal funds to any
school district that excludes the Boy Scouts from use of their
facilities, because the group refuses to admit homosexuals as
members and leaders.39 According to Senator Jessie Helms, a sponsor
of the amendment, the Boy Scouts' decision to ban gay members had
prompted local school boards and organizations like the United Way
to drop their financial support. "Radical [homosexual] militants
continue to maliciously assault this respectable and ethical
organization," Helms argued.' Unfortunately, Helm's rhetoric is not
atypical. Many mainstream religious organizations regularly attack
gay and lesbian rights claims,4 by claiming that gays are
depraved,4 2 lead troubled lives, and spread AIDS (Acquired Immune

37. RAZ, supranote 8, at 308.
38. McCabe makes this point as a criticism that Raz's theory of liberal perfectionism
needs to take into account. See McCabe, supra note 18, at 493, 512.
39. The effort to cut funds was in the form of an amendment to the 2001 Education Bill
that passed both Houses of Congress. See Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Major Revamp of
Education;Fight Over Funding Gap Looms, WASHINGTON POST, Jun. 15, 2001, at Al.
40. What Helms does not say is that many of sponsors who dropped their funding of the
Boy Scouts did so because they have a policy not to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, and funding the Boy Scouts would force them into violating this policy. See
Lizette Alvarez, Senate Passes Bill for Annual Tests in Public Schools, N. Y. TIMEs, Jul. 18,
1992, at Al.
41. See Peter Steinfels, Vatican Condones Gay-RightsLimits, N.Y. TIM, Jul. 18,1992, at 7.
42. DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALIrY 467-68 (1988); Eleanor
Blau, ChurchesAssailed Here as Foes of Homosexuals, N. Y. TIms, Mar. 25, 1971, at 30; Peter
Steinfels, Southern Baptists Condemn Homosexuality as "Depraved",N. Y. TMs, Jun. 17,
1988, at B6; Edward Tivnan, Homosexuals and the Churches, N. Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1987.
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Deficiency Syndrome) and other sexually transmitted diseases.4'
This is aside from the more right-wing religious groups and other
groups who regularly attack gay and lesbian rights. Some of them
filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the state-respondent in
Lawrence v. Texas, recently before the U.S. Supreme Court, which
held that state sodomy statutes, like the one in Texas that applies
only to certain same-sex behaviors, are unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Federal Equal Protection Clause." When
combined with legislative efforts to both set and retract state and
local laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, one sees
the deep divisions that the process of bringing gay people into
mainstream society has unearthed.4 5
Where sexual orientation is based on gender roles, additional
problems are raised for reasons unrelated to social intolerance. Such
descriptions can provide an overly simplified view of the diversity
of lifestyles that compose gay and lesbian communities. Even among
those who choose a so-called "gay" lifestyle, there is often a wide
range of differences in exactly what that lifestyle includes." This
diversity in lifestyles tells us that gay men and lesbians do not
easily fall within any one pattern. It also suggests another reason
why some choose to remain in the closet, beyond direct threat of a
broader culture of intolerance. Gay men and lesbians fear the
potential loss of their gender identity when made to fit mainstream
cultural explanations of who they are.
In effect, all of these concerns reflect the way identity and
culture coincides. Although the word 'identity' has had a variety of
different meanings in philosophy and psychology, the important
43. Roberto Suro, VaticanReproaches Homosexuals with a PointedAllusion to AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1986, at A18.
44. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Dudley Clendinen, Throughout the Country,Homosexuals IncreasinglyFlex
PoliticalMuscle, N. Y. TiMEs, Nov. 8, 1983, at A26; Jeffrey Schmalz, The Gay Vote; Gay Rights
and AIDS Emergingas Decisive Issues in Campaign,N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at AI;. Eric
Schmitt, Anti-Discrimination Proposal Delays Senate Vote on Bill Opposing Same-Sex
Marriage,N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at A24.
46. Some gays and lesbians are politically conservative, while others are liberal. See, e.g.,
David Brooks, Right Out of the Closet, N. Y. TIMEs, Jun. 27, 1999, at 34 (discussing the stance
of gay Republican, Log Cabin members). Some want open relationships or no permanent
relationships at all; others want marriage. See, e.g., Thomas Stoddard, Gay Marriages:Make
Them Legal, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1989, at 7. Some want to be parents; others do not. See, e.g.,
Laura Mansneurs, Under Many Banners: Varied Voices in Gay Life Not Always in Chorus,
N. Y. TmsS, June 26, 1994. A number want to be free to enter military service; others could
care less. See, e.g., Catherine Manegold, The Odd Place of Homosexuality in the Military, N.
Y. TiES, Apr. 18, 1993, at 4. Some prefer to be out at work, as well as to their parents and
friends; others prefer to remain in the closet. See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, A Tough Month in the
Life of a Policeman,N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1981, at 29.
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overlapping concern for us is its relation to important social
relationships and functions. Often connections to one's sex, social
class, and sometimes one's country of residence, define not only who
one is but how others perceive the individual and, essentially, are
constitutive of the self.47 At times, these connections may appear
contingent on choices one makes, which presumably one could have
made a different way. At other times, these connections seem
necessary as merely descriptive of one's own sense of self." In any
case, it may be difficult to determine which of these two modes of
connection outweighs the other. More importantly, if one's culture
does not encourage one to develop a critical outlook, where both
possibilities can be viewed, the former mode may dominate and this
may lead to a crippling of self-respect and self-esteem.49 For
example, in the case where one's identity reflects several separate
identities, such as being an American, a Christian, and a homosexual,
the conflicts can be not only wrenching, but can also reflect
choices about personal morality and a more honest description of
who one is.' In situations like this, a person may be ridden with
guilt or engage in self-denial. Moreover, similar self-conflicting
situations that might arise, for example, by the Catholic Church's
published position that even the desire for same sex activity is
intrinsically disordered," l can lead to a deep self-hatred and internalized
homophobia. Under these circumstances, autonomy is reduced,
even in the absence of formal legal restrictions that give support to
such limitations.
Identity is at least partially determined by culture, whether the
culture is that of the society at large or of a narrowly circumscribed
group whose geographical boundaries are even larger than the
society at large, like, for instance, the Catholic Church. If this
proposition is true, as many believe it is,5 2 then a different identity
47. See ERIK H. ERKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH 266 (W.W. Norton ed., 1969).
48. Here, 'necessary' refers to a mode of connection that is assertoric and seemingly
unchangeable.
49. The distinction here is between a normative evaluation of oneself and a prudential
evaluation of what one has achieved. I use self-respect to refer to the normative state of
believing oneself to be a morally good person and self-esteem to evoke the psychological state
of feeling self-satisfied with what one has accomplished or achieved. No doubt in some
contexts the two overlap, even conflict, as in the case of the self-satisfied bank robber, but
they need not necessarily overlap.
50. See Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual
Persons given at Rome by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Oct. 1, 1986), available at
httpJ/vatican.valroman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documentsrccon-cfaith_doc_19861001
-homosexual- persons-en.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
51. Id.
52. STEIN, supra note 25, at 71.
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threat may arise when gays and lesbians come out of the closet.
When gays and lesbians proudly do come out of the closet, they do
not directly challenge the identity of heterosexuals, because the act
does not make a statement about anyone other than themselves.
Nevertheless, they may indirectly challenge the identity of persons
who are either uncertain about their own sexual orientation, are too
ashamed of, or who lack the courage to confront it.5" They also may
challenge a person's identity regarding what it means to be a certain
sort of Christian or Moslem if the coming out issue is not addressed.
Challenges such as these can lead to violence and, doubtless, play
a role, for example, in the increased levels of hate crimes based on
sexual orientation, that have appeared over the past decade in the
United States.54 Additionally, challenges to self-esteem, where one's
own orientation may not be in question but one's need to feel
superior is at issue, result from the act of coming out. This is not to
say that some debate may not be worthwhile. There is a wide range
of difference in the kind of debate, from where the participants are,
from the start, treated as equals engaged in a fair discussion of
ideas to where one group is treated as inferior to another.
Still, despite these problems, coming out of the closet may be
the only way to avoid continuing marginalization by mainstream
society, because in doing so, one affirms, at least to some degree,
who one is. Even then, however, the benefits may not appear to
outweigh the costs. Even to those for whom the orientation is
natural, the costs of being open about who they actually are may
simply be too high a price to pay. The costs can be as devastating as
loss ofjobs, social status, affection of one's family, and even physical
assault.55 Additionally, there is the fear of others, who, because they
deny their own sexual orientation may respond irrationally, possibly
even violently, when confronted by openly gay people. This is
separate from the violent responses emitted by a social fabric that
regards homosexuality as immoral. In these situations, it is
reasonable to assume that many gay and lesbian individuals who
53. From a cultural point of view, attacks to conventional values challenges the moral
respectability of those for whom these values are the basis of being a worthy person. See also
GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 473-74; Daniel Goleman, Honophobia: Scientists Find Clues
to Its Roots, N. Y. TIMEs, Jul. 10, 1990, at C1.
54. Michael Cooper, Reports of Anti-GayCrimesIncreaseby 81 Percent,N. Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1998, at B2; Ronald Sullivan, Rise in Gay Bias Crimes Reported, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1993, at B6; Anti-Gay Crimes Are reportedon Rise in 5 Cities,N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at
A12. For a discussion of how some Fundamentalist Christians have encouraged this increase
violence, see GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 466-69.
55. E.R. Shipp, Homosexual Lawyers Keep FightingBarriers,N. Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1989,
at B113, 1989; I Weep... (Letter to the Editor-Name Withheld), N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept.
20, 1964, at A10.
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are threatened either internally or externally will not even claim
the rights that most Western societies offer their citizens to live
open, happy and productive lives.' This suggests that it is the
dominant culture of Western societies, that is often made present in
the way people are socialized, more than the occasional intolerant
person, that is the greatest danger to individual self-respect and
self-esteem. This occurs, because the dominant culture strips the
'deviant' of even the personal indicia necessary to live a fully
productive, self-satisfied life.
From this vantage point, one must conclude that if morality
encourages finding human self-fulfillment, at least where certain
kinds of harm are not present as outlined in the latter sections of
my discussion, it must include more than just the removal of legal
or formal restrictions on liberty. It must also, as this analysis has
suggested, recognize that the indicia of culture, including family,
tradition, religion, and limitations on individual self-awareness, all
need to be given attention. The key issue here is how to pay
adequate attention to each of them. Certainly, it is important for the
state, through the procurement of public education for its citizens,
to not only take a neutral position against a background culture
that would marginalize any particular group, but to take affirmative
action against such marginalization. This may be most effective,
because public education may be the best place for deep critical
evaluation of all fundamental norms. Silence in this case in not
neutral, but an endorsement of the status quo. The state might,
therefore, actively support access to the possibility of alternative
ways of life via literature, the arts, science, and other forms of
public education to promote a complete development of the self. To
do any less could be viewed as the state becoming a co-conspirator
in a systematic form of oppression that undermines an important
basis of human dignity, viz., individual self-respect and self-esteem,
especially with respect to matters of sexual orientation identity.

56. The rights I have in mind are to privacy, liberty, and nondiscrimination. The latter
exist for non-sexual orientation discrimination only in a few countries. See generally, N.Y.
TImEs, 20m CENTURYiN REviEw: GAYRIGHTS MOVEMENT (Vincent J. Samar ed., 2001) pt. IX,
International Scene, at 527-76. In the United States they only exist in thirteen states and a
growing number of municipalities, covering over 100 million Americans. See Jeremy S.
Barber, Comment, Re-Orienting Sexual Harassment:Why FederalLegislation is Needed to
Cure Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentLaw, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 493, 523 (2002).
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II. THE HARM PRINCIPLE OR PROGRAM V. MULTICULTURALISM
It is perhaps too much of an ideal to believe that official
tolerance, in the absence of different points of view, will eliminate
bias and prejudice from cultural institutions. Even though it is
axiomatic of traditional liberal society to tolerate different religious
and moral opinions, 7 opinions that certain forms of sexual conduct,
such as consensual adult homosexual conduct, are sinful or unnatural
are only theoretical, not a basis for legal proscription. 8 Even then,
it is not clear that any theory of liberalism, when brought to the
test, will hold up to truly promote toleration.59 For instance, in his
now famous passage of liberal idealism, John Stuart Mill asserts
what has become known as "the harm principle".' The principle
states that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
mental, is not sufficient warrant."61 The principle presupposes both
that some actions do not harm anyone else and that harm affecting
others cannot be a diffused metaphysical form of harm.62 Rather, it
must be an actual, occurrent physical or psychological harm.'
Regarding the first of these two presuppositions, the requirement
that the harm affect others, Mill himself says,
there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished
from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest;
comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct
which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with
their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation.
When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance:
for whatever affects himself may affect others through himself."
Mill suggests here that more should be done than just drawing
a distinction between actions which do not harm others, arguably
like alcoholism or drug abuse, from those that do, like child abuse.
In some cases, the least intrusive means of avoiding occurrences
57. BARRY, supra note 5, at 131.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LiBERTY 15 (1974).
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id.
63. See ALAN GEWIRTH, RASONAND MoRALrrY 232 (1978) [hereinafter GEWIRTH, REASON]
(suggesting the problem expositors of Mill have confronted in interpreting the harm principle
not to prohibit arbitrary, as opposed to nonarbitrary, forms of harm).
64. MILL, supra note 60, at 71.
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of the latter activity, like the parent who abuses his child when he
is under the influence of drugs, may be to limit the availability of
drugs. Although this is by no means certain. Mill allows for this
possibility provided that the real harm to be avoided is greater than
the harm created by the intervention of others.' Even with this
limitation in mind, some actions do seem properly outside the
public's concern. This sphere of human action is sometimes labeled
'private,' reflecting the general societal consensus that certain places
exist where society has little interests in regulation, because only
the interests of the consenting parties are at stake.6
As for the second presupposition, regarding the kind of harms
that can be prohibited, Mill again provides the indicator:
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding
liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty
of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral, or theological.... Secondly, the principle requires liberty
of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our
own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly,
from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within
the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom
to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the
persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not
forced or deceived.67
Note that the harm prohibited is more than just physical harm but
may include promise-breaking, defamation, and many other harms
that would be considered morally wrong.' While the harm also
includes the nonphysical, to avoid being nonarbitrary, it must not
be isolated to the personal moral beliefs of the person. That would
69
make the harm far too vague and its scope far too open-ended.
Even non-arbitrary, nonphysical harm may sometimes be too broad
65. Id.
66. For a discussion of how Mill's harm principle can be understood to protect private
actions, see VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVAcY: GAYS, LESBIANS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 66 (1991).
67. MILL, supra note 60, at 18.
68. Joel Feinberg, Limits to the Free Expressionof Opinion,in PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 262-77
(Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1986) [hereinafter Limits].
69. See GEwIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 9, at 232.
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a category, as for instance in the case of the would-be suitor who is
rejected.7" Obviously, what is needed is a criterion that picks out
harms that can be either physical or nonphysical, while at the same
time non-arbitrary and morally wrong. The latter will require
finding some value or set of values that every rational person must
agree to, perhaps on pain of contradiction. What that basis is, of
course, will be a matter of some controversy and a focus for concern
in the next section.
For the present, it is worthy of note that Joel Feinberg
understands these two presuppositions to recognize that"[e]xpressions
of opinion harm others when they are: defamatory (libelous or
slanderous), seditious, incitive to violence, malicious publications
of damaging or embarrassing truths, or invasions of privacy."7
More generally, Feinberg notes that the harm recognized by the
harm principle are only those that represent setbacks to another's
interests that are also wrongful within a normative theory.7 2
Legitimate setbacks, such as through competition or wrongful nonsetbacks, such as inadvertent trespass to land, are not sufficient
warrant for harm. Wrongful setbacks to which the recipient has
consented are also not sufficient warrants for harm. These include
harms voluntarily inflicted upon the actor by himself, or with
his approval by another.7 ' Feinberg believes that the harm
principle would not allow interference with individuals to avoid
these types of harms, even though the harms may involve personal
or psychological damage. 74 This narrow view of Mill's harm principle
may not be enough to protect gays and lesbians from the kind of
harm that ultimately undermines their individual self-respect and
self-esteem. The problem here arises because the causes of such loss
are often so pervasive and obscure that a bridge cannot always be
found that would connect a particular setback with a specific wrong.
This is distinguished from the kind of economic setback that can
occur when one is denied employment or housing in violation of, for
example, an antidiscrimination statute. In that situation, the harm
may be more readily assessable. The same cannot be said if the
harm principle is interpreted to prohibit sources of more ephemeral
causes of harm. If interpreted differently, what redress, if any,
would there be for such a problem? Unfortunately, the issue is not
resolved by merely granting toleration, even if the toleration is
70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Limits, supra note 68, at 217.
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL IAMITS TO THE CR MINAL LAW 36 (1984).
Id. at 35.
Id.
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backed by laws prohibiting discrimination. That is not to say,
however, that such laws may not be important to redress these less
obscure harms.75 If toleration is inadequate, then society must
consider which alternative should be advanced in order to combat
these more diffuse harms.
Another approach or, perhaps, another series of approaches to
this problem of combating diffuse harms, that is admittedly
criticized by Brian Barry, is the so-called "politics of difference"
approach, also commonly referred to as program multiculturalism. 6
According to Barry, supporters of these views often advocate
treating people differently "in response to their different culturally
derived beliefs and practices," as a way of treating them equally.17
The point here is to avoid the coercive effects of a dominant
culture by allowing members ofeach subculture to govern themselves.
In other words, equal treatment requires equal recognition and
forbearance of cultural differences, rather than the eradication of
such differences in order to give each person the same economic and
social opportunities. The public policy means to carry these
proposals out may be negative in the sense of granting exemptions,
for example, like allowing the Amish to remove their children from
required secondary education at age sixteen.78 The means may, in
fact, be positive in the sense of providing certain advantages to
individuals based on membership in some culturally defined
group. 79 An example of this would be an affirmative action policy
that reserves a set number of seats in a law or medical school for
persons who are members of groups defined by a distinctive culture.80
A multiculturalist argument that justifies these exemptions and
advantages is that they are necessary for minority groups to
maintain their own cultural identities.81 But why should society be
concerned with promoting various minority cultures, especially in
cases where the culture might itself be illiberal in its treatment of
its own members?
An important problem with these multiculturalist views then,
is that, despite their claims to cultural equality, they do not always
75. The problem is that we cannot find an adequate distinction between physical and
nonphysical harm capable of preserving self-fulfillment. Laws that make emotional distress
actionable will be unlikely to identify relevant defendants and avoid harms caused by an
intolerant dominant culture.
76. BARRY, supra note 5, at 17.
77. Id.
78. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
79. BARRY, supra note 5, at 17.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 116-17.
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treat others, including their own members, fairly, in that they do
not grant deference to the discovery of individual goods. s2 In the
case of exemptions, for example, if an adult Amish farm worker
chooses to later leave the community, other Amish shun him. This
consequently prohibits him from finding work within the Amish
community. 3 At the same time, he is not in a position to find work
outside of the community, because he has inadequate training due
to a lack of secondary education." Similarly, when seats are reserved
in professional schools for the purpose of bolstering the success of a
particular cultural group, others, who are not members of the group,
suffer, as a certain number of openings are not available to them. 5
The latter benefit might be justified to bring needed services to
segments of a society that are underrepresented in the professions
due to historical discrimination and financial hardships, but then
the claim would not be specifically to protect the existence of
minority cultures.86 It would rather be the utilitarian goal to provide
the greatest good for the greatest number.87 More generally, the
problem with these multiculturalist positions is that they bring
government to the side of groups that place specific disadvantages
on individual freedom of choice.
This occurs even before recognizing that a reactionary response
may also arise when government promotes minority cultures
programmatically. A challenge is posed by religious groups, like
'born again' Southern Baptists, who proclaim the sinfulness of
homosexuality and do not want schools to give their children a
positive view of gay lifestyles.8 8 One must also take into account
82. Id. at 153.

83. Id.
84. See id. at 242-43.
85. For an interesting argument on this point, see Lisa H. Newton, Reverse Discrimination
as Unjustified, 83 ETHICS 308-12 (1973) (arguing that no remedial rights exist for those who
were never counted from the start). But see Tom L. Beauchamp, The Justificationof Reverse
Discrimination,2 SOCIALJUSTICEAND PREFERENTIALTREATMENT 84-110 (1976) (arguing that

government policies to rectify discrimination are justified not to correct past discrimination,
but to eliminate present discrimination that might otherwise remain hidden).
86. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination, in
PHILOSOPHY AND PuBLIc AFFAIRs 348-63 (1973) (arguing that preferential treatment in

admissions may be necessary to offset secondary effects on the community due to racial and
sexual discrimination).

87. This would reflect a utilitarian goal if such services are either not currently available,
or, as is more often the case, available only to an inadequate degree. If that is the case, if
doctors are otherwise in oversupply to more traditionally white middle-class communities, a
utilitarian calculus would favor giving special admissions status to those who pledge to work
a set number of years in inner city ghettos, or poor rural or migrant farm communities.
88. This challenge arises in cases where groups take offense, either on the basis of
religious or cultural viewpoints, at having their tax dollars support forms of art that
illustrate sadomasochism.
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those parents who, again for religious or cultural reasons, choose to
take their children out of English or health education courses that
read novels about same-sex relationships or learn about safer sex
practices.89 A potential solution is to provide every child with an
education that accords with the beliefs and tenets of his or her
specific group. 0 Providing such diversity of education may create
the cooperative conditions necessary for society to flourish. It may
burden, however, in the sense of limiting aspirations, the person
who may someday want to leave his or her social group.9 Similar to
how tolerance may be too benign to deal with an intolerant
dominant culture, here we see that diversity of treatment may be
too aggressive to enable cross-cultural respect to develop.
Each of these two approaches (tolerance and multiculturalism)
does have something to offer to the promotion of individual freedom
and well-being against a dominant culture that would otherwise be
oppressive. Tolerance encourages official respect for differences,
even if it cannot eliminate important barriers to the manifestation
of these differences. Multiculturalism allows for difference, if not
public respect for difference. What I envision as modified liberalism
encourages both deference and respect for difference because it
places all groups on the same playing field of human rights.92 This
will become clear, as the human rights I propose that are necessary
to achieve this result are not merely those usually accepted by
democratic societies as ways to resolve disputes by public reason.9"
89. Barry discusses some of the concerns relating to religious persons taking their
children out of sex education classes and school districts that are opting out of providing or
mandating such programs. BARRY, supra note 5, at 225. Barry also discusses Afro-centrists,
who are seeking to ban books and change curricula that do not comport with their
epistemological or value systems, as well as gender-based schools and sexual orientationbased schools seeking their own unique curricula. He sees the latter as problematic, because
it goes against the modernist, as opposed to post-modernist, liberal view "that there is such
a thing as truth, as against my truth or your truth." Id. at 236.
90. We could support funding of the arts only at the level of the most noncontroversial
expressions.
91. Interestingly, Plato in The Republic says that the purpose of education is to harmonize
the city by limiting the poetry and rhythms that can be taught to the young. See, e.g., PLATO,
The Republic, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES INCLUDING THE LETTERS 424b-425a
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., bk.2 1961); PLATO, The Laws, in PLATO: THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUEs INCLUDING THE LETrERS 659f bk. 2 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., bk.2 1961).
92. Here I am in sympathy with Amy Gutmann's point, made during her Dewey lecture
at the University of Chicago on April 15, 2003, that democracies do not act justly when they
either ignore or pay too much attention to the identity groups that make them up.
93. Here I note John Rawls's view that a pluralistic society, with many different
incommensurable religious, philosophical or moral doctrines, can nevertheless, hang together
if the members of the society share a common view of justice, at least for the purpose of
resolving disputes among themselves. See JOHN RAWLS, POLTcAL LIBERALISM 19 (1993). The
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Such common approaches are usually based on shared principles of
social justice and falsely presuppose that most people are willing to
forego incommensurable, but deeply held, conceptions of the good.
A quick perusal of Western newspapers will make clear that many
people are not so willing to accept such middle-of-the-road outcomes,
as is often the case involving issues such as marriage and adoption
that affect gays and lesbians.9 4 Consequently, I will follow what I
believe to be a stronger foundation for human rights principles,
grounded in what all particularist and universalist moral systems
necessarily presuppose, even if they do not always recognize that
they do so. The system of values at which I will arrive will hopefully
be able to adjudicate disputes, even over seemingly incommensurable
conceptions of the good. Such a modified liberalism thus lies in
between tolerance and multiculturalism. It is a form of liberalism
that begins with the idea of freedom, but recognizes that freedom by
itself is not enough unless it is also modified by a good sized dose of
well-being in the sense described above."
Freedom subsumes rights to freedom of speech, press and
assembly; the right to worship, travel and own property; the right
to govern oneself and participate in the governance of one's society;
and the right to privacy.' In terms of culture, this means that no
culture should operate so as to deny individuals the right to
participate in the decision-making process of the group without, at
least, a means to exit the group without undue burden placed upon
them.9" Similarly, well-being by itself is not enough if the affected
problem with this view, as I argue elsewhere, is that such cross-cultural stability has little
guarantee, especially as the disputes command important value differences, as is seen in the
abortion debate and debates over same-sex marriage. See Vincent Samar, Just Society: A
Review of John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism, 22 BusINESS ETHics 629 (1995).
94. Even putting aside the few who engage in violent behaviors, many well-supported
groups have both lobbied against and boycotted efforts to find middle of the road outcomes.
See, e.g., Larry Bush, Majority vs. Gays, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1981 (discussing the Moral
Majority's efforts to have the U.S. House of Representatives overturn a District of Columbia
bill that decriminalized sodomy between consenting adults); David W. Dunlap, Gay
Advertising Campaign on TV Draws Wrath of Conservatives, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995
(describing how the Christian Broadcasting Network threatened other TV stations if they
broadcast a advertisement suggesting an impact between Pat Robinson's ministry and
gay teenage suicides); Mireya Navarro, Disney's Health Policy for Gay Employees Angers
Religious Right in Florida, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at A20 (discussing a Florida
Baptist convetion resolution to boycott Disney for offering health benefits to its samesex employee's partners),Florida Curb on Homosexuals Survives a Test, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1981 (discussing a Florida law barring state aid to any university providing funds, a meeting
place or recognition to groups advocating "sexual relations between persons not married to
each other").
95. See infra text accompanying note 9.
96. See GEWITH, REASON, supra note 63, at 256, 308-09.
97. See GEWInrT, SELF-FLFILMENT, supra note 9, at 154 (arguing for cultural pluralism).
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individuals have no control over the conditions under which their
well-being is guaranteed. Well-being subsumes the right to a decent
standard of living, including the right to work and have baseline
financial protections should one become unemployed,9" the right to
a decent education that both prepares one for a productive life and
teaches the truths of science along with developing an appreciation
of the arts,' and the right to an adequate system of health care."°
Consequently, the modified form of liberalism that I am proposing
must seek not only liberty in its usual sense of freedom from
constraint, but liberty directed towards the attainment of a selffulfilled life."0 ' When construed this way, liberalism is associated
not with specific ends but with a set of possible noble ends, all of
which can lead to the possibility of a happy and fulfilled life. My
notion of liberalism promotes a robust notion of individual autonomy
in that it broadens self-rule to contain the substantive relationships
of one's actions to a flourishing life. I pattern my argument on
Aristotle by recognizing that moral virtue is a kind of mean
determined by reason... and that a good (or happy) life is one where
10 3
its activities are in accordance with highest virtue, or reason.
My reason for focusing on autonomy in this more robust sense
of being directed towards the attainment of both a physically and
a psychologically satisfying life rather than treating it as simple
liberty, is to resolve a certain kind of conflict that is thought to exist
when liberalism competes with various multiculturalist conceptions
of the good. Liberalism attacks multiculturalism for being overextensive in the liberties it restricts. Multiculturalism claims
liberalism is too disinterested to protect important human goods.
98. See ALAN GEWImRH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 108, 134-35, 214-15 (1996)

[hereinafter GEWIRTH, COMMUNITY!.
99. See GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFMILMT, supra note 9, at 128.
100. Id. at 195.
101. My point here is normative. I am treating autonomy as a means to obtain what is most
valuable in life. This overlays what I take to be autonomy's standard meaning that the
conditions under which one chooses to act are only those set by the activity itself, unless
otherwise agreed to. In this sense, liberty is of paramount importance to my view of
autonomy. It is not simply liberty that defines autonomy, as I mean it. For in choosing to
engage in certain activities, one agrees to play by the rules that define those activities only
because one views them as beneficial to the self. For example, one will not choose to get
married unless one desires to achieve some benefit that comes from getting married.
Similarly, one will not seek to acquire the status of being an educated person, unless one
accepts certain standards (which at any time may be in flux) for why a good education is
valuable. This means that one may need to be acquainted with different kinds of marriages
and different kinds of benefits from education, if they are going to desire to engage in either
of these activities.
102. AmSTOTLE, NIcoMAcHEAN ETHICS, bk 2, ch. 6, 1106b36.
103. Id. at 288.
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In order to avoid these two problems, in the context of public
education, especially regarding gay and lesbian concerns, it must
be stated when liberalism should have the upper hand against
multiculturalist arguments and when multiculturalist arguments
should trump liberalism. An autonomy-centered approach will
resolve the problem by discerning when it is appropriate for public
education to affirm certain lifestyles to provide a meaningful life
from when it is inappropriate. It is necessary for me to be more
specific about what that sense of autonomy is and what roles it
implicates for public education.
III. WHY START FROM HUMAN RIGHTS?
I have been discussing some of the roles that culture plays in
respect to the development of both a social and personal identity for
gay and lesbian people. I have noted that the dominant culture in
several Western societies tends to marginalize this group. The
dominant culture discourages group members from coming out of
the closet and creates a social climate of fear and oppression that is
pervasive enough to affect one's private and public life. At the same
time, many gay and lesbian people, to varying degrees, still come
out of the closet." ° They form subcultural groups to secure their
needs for intimacy and self-identity,"5 and many make demands for
acceptance, to varying degrees, on the mainstream culture."°
Because the interplay between the dominant culture and this
subcultural group is often conflicting, a normative ordering for how
these groups should interact is necessary.
Here we see the need for a universal system of human rights to
adjudicate between the conflicting needs for self-fulfillment of
members of these different groups. More particularly, the dominant
culture should recognize the needs and interests of gays, lesbians,
bisexuals and transgendered people. The latter are included here
because, as noted above, the conflicts between the dominant culture
and gays and lesbians, in particular, are often conflicts over the
meaning and roles the dominant culture and various subgroups
assign to gender. In turn, all groups should value the norms of the
dominant culture when the result is likely to enhance the widest
freedom of choice of members of the groups. Obviously, the extent
to which each group should go to accommodate the other cannot lie
104. See GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 458.
105. For an interesting discussion of different views on the development of homosexual
subcultures, see id. at 15-17.
106. See id.
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in the values of either the dominant culture or the subcultural
group. To do so would entail either a tyranny by the mainstream
culture or an unjustified exception to the values of the dominant
culture for the subgroups.
I propose, instead, to work this issue from within a broader
system of universal human rights that would presumably govern
both the dominant cultural group as well as the subcultural groups.
The approach I will follow to setting out this system of rights tracks
the approach of Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality.0 7 This

proposed broader system will inevitably be controversial, but
philosophical theories that attempt to justify foundations for
ultimate moral views usually are. For this reason, I will also offer
an alternative system, admittedly less complete and less determinate,
to unlock the principle concerns I have with regard to public education
on gay and lesbian issues and suggestions to legitimize these
concerns. Needless to say, the latter approach is encompassed
within the broader previous approach. Here I am following a
distinction made by Jeremy Waldron between justification and
legitimation."° The former is a concern among professional
philosophers and is usually based on deciding between individual
rights and utilitarianism."° The latter is a concern of political
theorists who want to know what the limits are on majoritarian
rulemaking." ° The weaker approach I will take still makes use of
Gewirth's basic model, but now as an interpretative stance for
opining on well-accepted U.N. documents like the Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948."' The last section of this essay will apply
this Gewirthian interpretation to these documents to provide a
semblance of a response to the cultural problems discussed.
In Reason and Morality, Gewirth argues that all moral theories
presuppose the individuals they address to be voluntary purposive
agents. Assuming this starting point to be plausible, we begin here
to develop a determination of fundamental human rights. The
method that Gewirth employs to accomplish this task, called
"dialectically necessary"," 2 begins with what all moral theories
share in common and proceeds from there to a set of human rights
that no rational agent logically can deny without contradiction. The
argument proceeds, from within the internal conative standpoint of
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See generally GEWIRTH, REASON, supra note 63.
JEREMY WALDRON, LEBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1999 393 (1993).
Id. at 392.
Id.
See generally Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 2.
See GEwuRrH, REASON, supra note 63, at 48.
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the agent , to see what she can or cannot logically agree to when
claiming to do any action for any purpose. The agent begins by
asserting: (1) "I do X for purpose E.""3 This is a statement of what
all moral theories presuppose, namely, that each agent does some
action X voluntarily for some purpose E. The quotation marks
signify that the agent's assertion is from within her own point of
view. Here, we are concerned with tracing out the underlying logic
behind the set of claims the agent must make (at least implicitly) if
she is to do any action for any purpose. From this first statement,
it follows that the agent adopts (2) "E is good," whereby "good" is not
necessarily meant a moral good." 4 It is sufficient that the "good"
references a reason, motive, or pro-attitude for why the agent
acts." 5 Obviously, if the agent thought E was bad in every sense,
she would not choose to do X. So, the sense of good here follows
solely from the agent's attitudinal commitment to act for some
purpose of her own. Next, she asserts (3) "My freedom and wellbeing are necessary goods."" 6 Here freedom pairs with voluntariness,
and well-being pairs with purposiveness." 7 Freedom means that
the agent is unconstrained in her action by others and also
possesses knowledge of the relevant circumstances for her action.
"Well-being in the inclusive sense", that Gewirth discusses,
"comprises having the general capabilities and successfully exercising
them."" 8 In this sense, it fits in with the notion of an agent as the
pursuer of particular goods." 9 If the agent is to act for some purpose
she regards as good, she must also positively value those necessary
features of the action that allow her to act, namely, her freedom to
act and her well-being that makes action possible. From (3),
Gewirth states that the agent claims: (4)" I have rights to freedom
and well-being."120 The point is that the agent must, at least
implicitly, claim rights to freedom and well being, if she is to claim
to act at all. Gewirth sees this as a matter of pure consistency in
which the claim to act presupposes the necessary conditions for
generally successful action. Still, because some might object to the
113. Id. at 49.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 64.
116. Initially Gewirth discusses freedom and purposiveness as the basis of the agent's
claim, but he soon shows that the relevant sense of purposiveness at stake is what would
entail well-being in the sense of fulfilling certain necessary capacities for human action. See
id. at 57. If one has no legs, for example, then absent some prosthetic device, one cannot walk.
117. See id. at 62.
118. Id. at 60.
119. Id. at 61.
120. Id. 64.
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introduction of the word "rights" at this point, Gewirth considers the
consequences if the agent adopted the opposite position to (4). 121
First, Gewirth notes that (3) might be rewritten, without
substantive alteration, to bring out its essential connection to
purposive action. The revised statement, which he calls (3a), reads,
"I must have freedom and well-being."1 2 Essentially, I must have
freedom and well-being if I am to do any X for any purpose E that
I regard as good. If the agent now were to deny (4), call it (4'), she
23
would be denying "I have rights to freedom and well-being."1
Consequently, our agent must also deny (5') that "all other persons
ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and wellbeing."12 4 This occurs, because the rights claims she is engaging are
claim-rights, signifying that they correlate with the duties of others
as opposed to more general liberties or privileges which may have
no corresponding respondent. 1 25 From there, it follows that the
agent must accept the premise that (6') "I may not have (i.e., it is
permissible that I not have) freedom and well-being."126 However,
(6') contradicts (3a), which means that either (6') or (3a) must be
wrong. But, (3a) was set forth as a mere restatement of our
noncontroversial premise (3); whereas, (6') was derived from our
denial of the controversial premise (4). Consequently, (4), as originally
written, must have been correct. 127 This is, in effect, an indirect
proof of proposition (4). If the opposite of a questionably logical move
leads to a contradiction, the move as originally set forth must have
been correct.'2 8
Now, it should be noted that so far Gewirth has only shown that
to be consistent, if the agent wants to do X for purpose E, she must
at the same time, affirm rights to freedom and well-being. Stated
differently, the claim to rights by the agent is strictly prudential.
This is because it is made from within the agent's internal conative
121. Id. at 80.
122. Id. at 81.
123. See id. at 80.
124. Id.
125. See WEsLEYHOHFELD, FUNDAMENTALLEGALCONCEPTIONS 36-38 (1919). I do note that
there may exist duties that are not correlated with rights like, for example, Immanuel
Kant's idea of"imperfect duties," but these would not be the sort of duties with which I am
concerned here. For a discussion of imperfect duties, see IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR
METAPHYSIKDER SrrrEN (1785); see also, IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OFTHE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 39 n.10 (1976).
126. See GEWIRTH, REASON, supra note 64, at 80.
127. See id.
128. In logic, a reductio ad absurdumproof, or what is sometimes called an indirect proof,
suffices to prove the original claim. See HOWARD KAHANE, LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY: A MODERN
INTRODUCTION 92-96 (6th ed. 1990).
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point of view to do X for purpose E.' 9 To transform this same rights
claim into a universal moral rights claim, it must further be shown
that any agent logically must admit, on pain of contradiction, that
all other agents also have these rights. In this way, the agent would
be committed to giving due deference to the rights of her recipients,
especially the most important matters of their concern, and herself.
To transfer the agent's rights claim into a universal moral
rights claim requires that she further (5) recognize that the sole
reason for which she made her rights claim was that she wanted to
do X for purpose E. 30 In other words, no other reason than my being
an agent, such as my being of certain race, gender, sexual
orientation, or intelligence, played a role in my making this claim.
This occurs, because nothing distinguishes one person's claim from
another's, as all claims are being asserted alone on the basis
that each is an agent. This is an illustration of the principle of
sufficient reason.'
It also follows that the agent must, then,
recognize (6) that any person who seeks to do X for purpose E could
make the same claim. 3 2 This is an example of the "principle of
universalizability" 33 From these two further conditions, sufficient
reason and universalizability, the agent concludes: (7) that if she
denies rights to her fellow agent that on the same basis she affirms
for herself, she contradicts herself.3 4 In other words, the agent
concludes that she must (8) "Act in accord with the generic rights
[i.e., the rights to freedom and well being] of both her recipients
and herself."13 The latter statement Gewirth calls the "Principle
of Generic Consistency" or "PGC"for short. 136 According to him, this
is the supreme principle of morality, as it follows from what any
129. See GEwuIrH, REASON, supra note 63, at 79.
130. See id. at 109-10; see also Alan Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION NOMOS XXIII 47 (John W.
Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1981) [hereinafter Basis and Content].
131. See GEWIrH, REASON, supra note 63, at 104-05. The principle of sufficient reason
actually come from Gottfried Leibniz, who asserted it thus: "Nothing happens without
a sufficient reason, i.e. without it being possible for someone wih an adequate knowledge of
things to give a reason sufficient to determine why they are that way and not otherwise."
G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings, in PRINCrPES DE LA NATURE
ET DE LA GRACE, FONDlS EN RAISON 602-03 (1714) translatedin CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY AND
SCIENCE 96 (Stuart Brown, R. Niall eds., 1988).
132. See GEWIvrT, REASON, supra note 63, at 133.
133. Id. at 105.
134. Id. at 133.
135. Id. at 135. But see GEWInRTH's ETHICAL RATIONALISM: CRITICAL ESSAYS WITH A REPLY
By ALAN GEwIRTH (Edward Regis, Jr. ed., 1984); see also DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE
DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF ALAN GEWIERTH'S
ARGUMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY (1991).
136. GEWIRTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 135.
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agent, operating within any moral system, logically must
37
presuppose on pain of contradiction with being an agent.'
Moreover, because any person can go through this process to reach
the PGC, the latter can also be asserted not just dialectically (from
within the agent's own standpoint), but assertorically (without the
13
quotation marks), as a true ground governing all human action.
For our purposes, the Gewirthian analysis provides the
groundwork for resolving cultural conflicts both in the first instance
and as a possible means of interpretation of relevant human rights
documents. For, insofar as the basic norms of any culture can
impact freedom and well-being, they must, at minimum, be
protective of these universal human rights. Put another way,
neither the dominant culture nor any subcultural groups can limit
an individual's freedom except insofar as to protect the rights of
others.'3 9 By the same token, the PGC does recognize that individuals,
as part of the development of their own well-being, may consent
to conditions for themselves that are more restrictive of their
freedom than what they can command for others.' 4° An example
of this is persons who choose to live the ascetic life of a monk or nun.
Under the freedom component of the PGC, individuals may place
restraints upon themselves in their private lives, such as where to
live, what principles to live by, and with whom to live, that they
cannot place on others. 141 To place such restrictions on others would
be to use one's freedom to attack another's, which would, in turn,
place one in the position of affirming rights for themselves that on
the same basis one denies another.' 2 Such a contradictory position
would amount to a failure to afford equal regard to the freedom of
others, where others are equal by virtue of being agents. 43 Except
in contexts where the other himself is violating someone's rights, is
it appropriate, for example, to imprison a person for his or her
behavior.'" Transactional inconsistency, which occurs when freedom
is denied except as a rectification for the violation of rights, is

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

145.
145-46.
274-77.
163.

163-64.
275-77.
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properly assigned to the category of invidious discrimination and in
that sense raises
an equality objection where all persons are not
15
equally.
treated
Gewirth ranks the rights to freedom and well-being in order of
their importance to purposive agency. 46 Under the freedom
component, the goods that form the objects of these rights receive
equal treatment, as they have more or less equal value depending
on the immediate needs of the situation." 7 In contrast, under the
well-being component, basic goods rank as most important, because
they are necessary to simply existing as an agent." They include
rights to life, physical integrity, and mental equilibrium. 49 Next in
the well-being rankings fall the nonsubtractive goods, or those
necessary to maintain an undiminished level of purposive activity.' 50
The rights to these goods include, but are not limited to, rights not
to be lied to, cheated, or made the recipient of broken promises.' 5 '
Finally, additive goods are included in these rankings.'5 2 These
53
goods develop and enhance one's capacity for purpose fulfillment.
They include, among others, rights to a decent public education,
adequate amounts of financial welfare, and health care.' 5 Together,
these well-being rights represent three classes of goods, which, when
juxtaposed to the PGC's right to freedom, constitute a strong ground
for both tolerance and human welfare in respect to those goods that
allow one both to maintain and develop purpose fulfillment.'
The well-being rights also provide the argument for affirming
the expectations of subcultural groups whose rights are often
limited by a less tolerant and more austere dominant culture than
what these human rights would otherwise provide. This issue is
important for our discussion, because if the mainstream culture is
less tolerant of differences in various conceptions of good, the PGC
requires intervention to offset illiberal aspects of that dominant
culture. It may not be able to directly prohibit, in all cases, the
mainstream cultural attitudes, as those are often too diffuse to be
the objects of a general prohibition. However, the PGC can operate
145. Id. at 206-08.
146. Id. at 62-63.
147. Id. at 62.
148. Id. at 63.
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id. at 55, 63.
151. See Basis and Content, supra note 130, at 56.
152. See GEWiRTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 63.
153. Id. at 56.
154. See GEWMT, COMMUNITY, supra note 98, at 14; see also GEWIrTH, SELF-FULFnIMNT,
supra note 9, at 95.
155. GEWIRTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 54-55.
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less directly to achieve a similar end at least through education, if
not public pronouncement.
In terms of particular moral systems, the PGC provides the
baseline rights that all people deserve simply by virtue of being
human agents.'56 The PGC requires that adequate public education
be provided in society not only to avoid misunderstandings of what
goods are available, but also to highlight how different choices can
impact one's life. 57 This results from the fact that the PGC has both
a positive and negative aspect. ' The former follows from universalizing
what every agent would request on pain of contradiction when there
is no comparable cost to oneself. It also follows from the fact that the
additive good of education to develop one's capacities to the fullest
is needful to purpose fulfillment. Thus, the PGC demands that good
public education be made universally available so that every person
will have the minimum requisites to develop capacities that will
ultimately lead to his or her self-fulfillment.5 9 In short, all of the
rights contained in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
("Declaration") would be justified under the PGC. 1"
It should also be noted that the conceptual separation between
the freedom component and the well-being component does not
mean that one type of right is more important than the other.' For
example, without adequate education, welfare, and health care,
rights to autonomy and self-governance seem hollow.' 62 Similarly,
without the freedom component, the provision of well being can
appear very paternalistic, in effect disregarding the individual's
conception of herself.6 ' Consequently, the normative requirements
of the two components must be treated together, as both mandatory,
to insure purpose fulfillment." Rarely, the freedom component
must yield to the well-being component.' This occurs, because
basic well-being is necessary to the very possibility of purposive
agency." Even excluding this possibility, one is inclined to ask:
How is the PGC to react to a dominant set of cultural norms that
appear oppressive to the self-fulfillment of gays and lesbians?
156. Id. at 135.
157. See GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFnIENT, supra note 9, at 97.
158. GEWIrTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 135.

159. See GEwirrH, SELF-FULFLMENT, supra note 9, at 97.
160. See Vincent J.Samar, Gay Rights as a ParticularInstantiationofHumanRights, 64 ALB.
L. REv. 983, 1008 (2001); see also Declaration,supra note 2 (showing what these rights are).
161. GEWIRTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 250-55.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
See GEwiRTH, SELF-FULFiLLMENT, supra note 9, at 112.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 264-66.

166. Id.
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Before doing that, however, I will now take the more limited
approach mentioned earlier, involving an interpretation of the
Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948.167 Although more aspirational than binding on the member
states, in the sense that the Declaration is not viewed as a treaty
under international law, the document describes two classes of
rights: political rights and economic/social rights. 1'8 These rights are
listed as obligations of member states of the U.N., subject only to the
limitations discussed infra.6 9 Even setting aside legal obligations,
however, these rights likely represent moral values of a democratic
society adopting the Declaration, even if they may not resolve all
fundamental moral conflicts within that society. Consequently, they
can be subject to and made part of a moral interpretation of
individual rights especially, because they were adopted by the
member states making up the U.N. The primary difference between
the two types of rights described is that the U.N. recognizes that
economic and social rights may not be immediately achievable in
every nation worldwide because of differences in economic
circumstances. 7 0 Therefore, member states enjoy flexibility in how
7
soon they are required to adopt the social and economic provisions.' '
Bearing this in mind, the specific rights adopted by the
Declaration are as follows. The political category includes rights
such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of person; 7 2 to not be
held in slavery or subjected to torture or inhumane treatment; 7 3 to
not be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; 74 to a fair and
public trial;171 to be treated as an equal before the law; 17 to a
presumption of innocence; 77 to travel and asylum;7 8 to change
nationality; 179 to own property;"s to freedom of thought, conscience,

167. Declaration,supra note 2.
168. Id. (determining that certain types of rights, like social security in Article 22, shall be
made available " in accordance with the organization and resources of each State," rather
than distinguishing classes of rights on its face).
169. See id. at pmbl.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Declaration,supra note 2, at art. 3.
173. Id. at arts. 4-5.
174. Id. at art. 9.
175. Id. at art. 10.
176. Id. at art. 7.
177. Id. at art. 11.
178. Id. at arts. 13-14.
179. Id. at art. 15.
180. Id. at art. 17.
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and religion; 8 ' to hold and express opinions; 8 2 to peacefully
assemble;'" to be able to take part in government"s and to have
privacy respected. 5 Most of these rights are negative in the sense
of demanding noninterference with actions, although some are
positive, demanding entitlements or assistance in various forms,
such as the right to own property, to change nationality, to asylum,
to a fair and public trial, to a presumption of innocence, to be
treated as an equal before the law, and to take part in government.'
In contrast, the social and economic category includes almost all
positive rights such as rights to an adequate standard of living;1 7 to
education including compulsory primary education;1 8 to participate
in the cultural life of the community;' 8 9 to social security; 19° to work,
rest, and leisure;' 9 ' and to a social and international order in which
these rights are realized.' 92 This rights category of the Declaration
does however, recognize at least one negative right: the right to join
unions without interference.' 9 3
An interesting historical point is that the delineated political
rights appear similar to those rights traditionally thought of as
natural rights. 4 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, for example,
understood the use of natural rights language to bring about joint
action in pursuing a common good.' 95 Hobbes, in particular, saw
natural rights as inherent freedoms to do what one wanted when no
greater force was present. 96 In contrast, Locke saw natural rights
as property claims first to one's own body and the labor of one's
97
hands and eventually to own the products of one's labor power.
Both theorists essentially followed a bottom-up approach to rights
that begins with the individual and moves toward the society. This
181. Id. at art. 18.
182. Id. at art. 19.
183. Id. at art. 20.
184. Id. at art. 21.
185. Id. at art. 12.
186. Id. at arts. 3-21.
187. Id. at art. 25.
188. Id. at art. 26.
189. Id. at art. 27.
190. Id. at art. 22.
191. Id at arts. 23-24.
192. Id. at art. 28.
193. Id. at art. 23(4).
194. J. Roland Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Rights-A Global View, in
HUMAN RIGHT 2 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981).
195. Id. at 3.
196. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 72 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston eds. ) (1651).
197. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREAT=S OF GovEnN
17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952)
(1690).
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contrasts to the older natural law approach that first treats broad
concerns about law, justice, duty, and the public interest, and only
from there moves to the individual. 9 ' By following the bottom-up
approach, natural rights rhetoric replaced the generally teleological,
or top-down, approach of the old natural law rhetoric, which had
been in common use for a long time, and had been a focus of the
classical understanding of "natural rights." 99
In natural law rhetoric, one began with a conception of the end
one hoped to achieve and, around that end, fashioned a view of how
society should be organized.2" Contrastingly, modern natural rights
rhetoric claims center on the self, even though individuals often
join their claims in pursuit of some common good.20' Historically,
this modern sense of natural rights rhetoric arose, because
individuals could not count upon the state to follow principles of
equality and nonarbitrariness, and human rights justified
individuals' implementation of self-help in order to protect their most
basic interests.2 2 Such rights were thought to be given by God, 0 3 the
result of humans being rational creatures,"' or the result of the fact
that most human needs and abilities did not fundamentally differ
between individuals.2 5 Still, natural rights rhetoric shared with
natural law rhetoric a sense that the claimed rights were absolute
and invariant.20 6 Today's human rights rhetoric does not make quite
this same claim.
Juxtaposing natural rights against human rights, one discovers
various similarities including that the rights proclaimed are thought
to be universal, in that they are held by all peoples irrespective of
any difference in social or economic class. 20 7 The Declaration
specifically states that the rights enumerated therein hold for all
people without regard to "race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status."28 Although sexual orientation is nowhere specified in
the Declaration, the document does include the phrase "other
status." If sexual orientation is conceived as a status, there would
198. See Pennock, supra note 194, at 1-2.
199. See id.
200. See ST. THOMAS AQuINAS, 2 THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 744-45
(Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945).
201. See Pennock, supra note 194, at 3.
202. Id.
203. See LOCKE, supra note 197, at 16-17.
204. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63-64 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
205. See HOBBES, supra note 196, at 68-69.
206. See Pennock, supra note 194, at 6.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Declaration,supra note 2, art. 2.
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be a basis under this provision for granting at least limited
protection to homosexuals." 9 Of course, this would itself be highly
controversial, as the status/conduct distinction is often used to deny
gays and lesbians rights to be open and honest about who they
are.21 Still, proof that the proscribed conduct is not harmful when
engaged in by consenting adults, that it, indeed, can be quite selffulfilling might eliminate the basis for the conduct concern as
an invasion of individual privacy. Indeed, Article 12 of the
Declaration recognizes a right to privacy, stating, "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation."2 n
More importantly, the United Nations has adopted two
covenants since the Declaration that have the force of treaties and
are specifically designed to respond to discrimination, including
cultural discrimination: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR7)2 " and Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"). 2' s For example,
articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW require states to alter or otherwise
abolish cultural practices and patterns that discriminate against
women on the grounds that they are inferior or on grounds based
on stereotypes. 2 4 Articles 2(1), 4(1), and 26 of ICCPR provide very
broad anti-discrimination provisions. 2"5 As these two conventions
evince, culture is not outside the concerns of either existing
international law or morality.21 6 In part this is because human
rights are also like natural rights in that they are regarded as
inalienable.2 1 7 One cannot forfeit these rights, short of intentionally
attacking an innocent person.2 18 Additionally, every human being
possesses the same measure of these rights.2 19
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 654
(2003) (outlining the U.S. Military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy).
211. Declaration,supra note 2, art. 12.
212. InternationalCovenanton Civil andPoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1966) (bearing 142 state parties including
the United States, who ratified it with reservations including on the non-discrimination
sections 2(1), 4(1), and 26) [hereinafter ICCPR].
213. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 19 I.L.M. 33, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (bearing 165 state
parties not including the United States) [hereinafter CEDA WI.
214. Id. at arts. 2(f), 5(a).
215. ICCPR, supra note 212, at arts. 2(1), 4(1), 26.
216. Id.; CEDAW, supranote 213, at 161A.
217. Pennock, supra note 194, at 6.
218. Id. (implying that when one intentionally seeks to harm another, the other can resist
such harm even if that means harming the perpetrator in return).
219. Id. at 15-16.
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With respect to the differences between human rights and
natural rights, human rights are not unlimited as illustrated by the
fact that social security2 and compulsory education22 ' are recognized
by the Declaration along with its recognition of human liberty,22 2
despite the former's potential to limit the latter. 2 3 Nor are human
rights always absolute. It has already been mentioned that where
an economy will not allow their immediate satisfaction, economic
and social rights will not be obligatory.22 4 This is an example of the
Kantian dictum "ought implies can," here applied to the international
recognition of human rights.22 If a country is unable to provide its
citizens with such benefits as, for example, social security, it should
not have to undermine what economy it has in attempting to do so.
Of course, a nation is obligated to not just sit on its hands but to
significantly work toward the development of an economy that in
the not too distant future will be able to meet these needs. In other
words, a nation cannot rely on the status quo to be an ever-present
excuse to deny these social and economic rights to its people in
perpetuity. So, human rights may be overridden, but only where
circumstances warrant, which means only that not overriding the
right(s) will likely lead to undermining the very reasons for
protecting human rights in the first place.2 2
For example, the rights recognized by the Declaration certainly
allow for adjustments to accommodate advances in technology and
medicine, improved economic conditions, and increased awareness
and sensitivity to various human needs, including arguably those
related to the development of a cultural identity.22 7 In the instance
where the right to life may be involved, it arguably would not apply
to keeping alive a comatose patient in a persistent vegetative
state.2 28 Here one could see a helpful interpretative role for different
notions of human agency. For example, establishing the difference
between actual and perspective agents, versus one who is no longer
an agent helps in regard to this difficult metaphysical question. It
also helps with regard to questions concerning the moral status of
220. Declaration,supra note 2, at art. 22.
221. Id. at art. 26.
222. Id. at art. 3.
223. See discussion supra Section I, at 143.
224. See id.
225. IMMANUEL KANT, THE C~RrIQUE OFJUDGMENT 345 n.48 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 1987).
226. See Pennock, supra note 194, at 20-21.
227. See discussion supra Section I, at 143.
228. See generally Vincent J. Samar, Is the Right to Die Dead?, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 221
(2000) (discussing the status of the right to die following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Quill and Glucksberg).
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the unborn.22 9 Here, the notion of agency might distinguish those
who are only potential agents from actual or prospective agents. If
taken in this light, then the rights protected ought not to be
interpreted to prevent women from possessing the right to choose
abortion, especially if the mother's life or health is at stake.230
Although historically, the origin of natural rights was often sought
in metaphysics or theological doctrines, some scholars are much
more uncertain about the foundation for these rights.2 31 As
my purpose here is to discuss the role of public education to offset
the effects of a marginalizing dominant culture in political systems
where human rights are at least acknowledged, if not fully existent,
I will not attempt any further justification for such rights than
the Gewirthian one already offered. My purpose is to develop a
consistent approach for how such rights might implicate a set of
changes in the way public education handles gays, lesbians
bisexuals and transgendered people. Therefore, it is enough to leave
the matter of which rights to those that are already recognized
by the U.N., 2 granting that words will need interpretation and that
the Gewirthian approach, even at its weakest stance would
afford that.
The relevance of this human rights review is the groundwork
it provides for resolving potential cultural conflicts in societies that
already proclaim these rights. Insofar as the basic norms of any
culture can impact autonomy, those who claim to uphold these
human rights should be mindful of their culture's norms and the
way the norms affect personal autonomy. Put as a principle, neither
the dominant culture nor any subcultural groups in these societies
should limit an individual's freedom or well-being, except insofar as
to protect the equal rights of others. 3 This, referred to as the
United Nations Human Rights Principle ("UNHRP"), serves as a
guide, demanding that good public education be made available to
all persons so that every person will have the minimum requisites
229. See Ronald Dworkin, The GreatAbortion Case, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jun. 29,1989, at 49.
230. Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
47, 50-54 (1971).
231. Alan Gewirth, for example, tries to discover these rights in what all agents logically
must accept qua agent on pain of contradiction. See, GEwiRTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 64.
John Rawls originally attempted to discover these rights in an intuitionistic social
construction of a fair and just society. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34-40 (1971).
Robert Nozick attempted to discover these rights using historical information that was not
patterned. See ROBERTNOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 153-64 (1974). Thomas Jefferson
identifies these rights as "self-evident" intuitions. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (1776).
232. See Declaration,supra note 2.
233. Id. at 6.
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to develop the capacities that will ultimately lead to his or her selffulfillment.2 3 4 In terms of particular cultural values, the UNHRP
can provide the baseline rights, including but not exclusively
reserved to the right to a decent education, that all people deserve
simply by virtue of being human agents, especially when interpreted
within a Gewirthian framework. It can also allow for a very limited
exception, as is already thought to be the case, to this or any
other right insofar as it would represent a significant economic
disadvantage if proffered by an underdeveloped country. 3 5 How
then should the UNHRP react, especially via public education, to
a specific set of dominant cultural norms in developed Western
democracies that are oppressive to the self-fulfillment of gay and
lesbian people?
IV. How OBSERVING THE UNHRP MIGHT IMPACT GAY AND
LESBIAN LIVES
The question now becomes how the UNHRP, with the
interpretation I place on it by the PGC,236 squares with a certain
type of particularist morality, that just happens to be the majority's
morality, if it is also oppressive to a minority group. Calling the
dominant cultural norms particularist means that they may not
have the universalizability that Gewirth's argument requires of the
PGC.237 The point here is to determine if, under such circumstances,
public education should do more than just encourage discussion
and debate about arguably coercive values held by the majority,
even if there is no official or legal enforcement of violations
of the UNHRP. Stated differently, should public education stand
idly beside the values the dominant culture represents, even if those
values are inconsistent with the UNHRP and likely to cause
harm to a subcultural group? If the answer is no, then what does
the UNHRP require of public education? The UNHRP requires
public education to affirmatively offset specific illiberal aspects of
the dominant culture. To fully understand this issue, let us begin
by asking how the UNHRP stands to particularist moralities
in general. First one must examine how certain cultural attitudes
that harm various group identities survive to undermine even
an official view of liberal tolerance with legal prohibitions against
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. See generally GEWRTH, COMMUNrTY, supra note 98, at 19 (defining the Principle of
Generic Consistency (PGC)).
237. See id. at 16-20.
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overt discrimination.
Consider the society that views homosexuality as a form of
mental illness and same-sex desire as a pathological illness against
which people need protection." 8 In such a society, even the liberally
minded person, or the person who may be uncertain of his or her
own sexuality, might, nevertheless, believe that homosexuals should
be barred from public sexual expressions and that such persons'
lifestyles ought to be hidden if not condemned. As an example of
such ingrained attitudes, consider E. M. Forester's Maurice, in
which an English teacher comments to his student reciting a
classical work of literature, "Omit: a reference to the unspeakable
vice of the Greeks."" 9 In such a climate, it is difficult to imagine how
a person, becoming aware of his own homosexuality, would take any
different view of it than what the dominant culture provides.
Perhaps he would consider himself loathsome, a person to be pitied,
or possibly a danger that society needs to protect against.2 ° It is less
likely, unless the person has a great capacity to see past the cultural
definitions, that he would see himself as perfectly fine and his
society as troubled. At best, he might consider himself as going
through an unhappy phase, which, with strength of will, he might
overcome. Of course, I am not saying that seeing through cultural
barriers is impossible or there would never be any progress or
dissension by disenfranchised groups. The possibility of that
happening at any given time, is not high, especially as religion, family
expectations, and public ostracization reinforces these barriers.
Consequently, it is important to recognize that the UNHRP
does not require diversities of cultural norms just to offset possible
dominant cultural excuses to violate fundamental human rights.2 '
Nor does the UNHRP justify maintaining any unexamined norms
that may influence the psyche in such a way that a person cannot
easily overcome them. 2 2 This is true regardless of the popularity of
the view among the dominant culture or to any subgroup.2 3 If there
is reason to believe that these norms are not to an individual's
238. See, e.g., Robert Thrumbull, Homosexuals ProudofDeviancy, MedicalAcademy Study
Finds, N. Y. TIMES, May 19, 1964, at 1 (noting 'Homosexuality is indeed an illness"); see
generally Jonathan Ned Katz, Treatment, in GAY AMERICAN HISTORY, LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
IN THE USA: A DOCUmENTARY 197 (1976).
239. E. M. FORESTER, MAURIcE 51 (1987).
240. KAPLAN, supra note 36, at 24, 146.
241. See James Brooke, After Beating of a Gay Man, Town Looks at it Attitudes, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at A12 (noting that one of the killers of Matthew Shepard had allegedly
killed him because of a pass made in a bar); see generally Declaration,supra note 2.
242. See Declaration,supra note 2.
243. See id.
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benefit to maintain, then that reason needs to be evaluated. On the
other hand, the UNHRP will not require that such norms be merely
discarded as unimportant for fear of covering up some truth in the
process.'" The UNHRP does require that people be educated to take
critical approaches to the norms their culture presents them in
order to maintain freedom and well-being.2 45 This means that the
UTNHRP demands that education not only set forth an alternative
set of values to offset the more harmful affects of a dominant
culture's values, but that at all levels of education where cultural
norms are implicated, no critically unexamined values should
dominate. 2 This latter condition stops background coercive values
from being allowed to percolating institutional structures so as to
deny human rights. It also recognizes that such coercive background
values can have similarly serious abusive affects on human selffulfillment as more overt forms of human rights violations.
Obvious violations of human rights occur when a person is
killed, physically harmed,24 7 lied to, or cheated, especially if the
harm is such that he can no longer function as he previously could.
A person is also harmed when his sense of self-worth is so demeaned
by the culture that he can no longer pursue what to him would be
a worthwhile life. This is evident from the way self worth is
intimately connected to purposeful action. As Gewirth states it,
[c]entral to additive well-being[,J viewed as capacities or
dispositions[,] is the prospective agent's sense of his own worth.
We have seen that every agent, to the extent that he avoids
alienation, regards his particular purposes as worth pursuing
and hence attributes value to them. When such evaluative
purposiveness is more than incidental and transient, the agent
has an abiding self-esteem in that he views the worth of his
goals as reflecting his own worth as a rational person. He may
indeed be self-critical in that he unfavorably estimates his
performance in relation to specific objectives. But amid such
particular variations he must have a general acceptance of
himself as a person whose life, freedom, and well-being are
worthy of protection and development. In this way he has a
secure sense of his own identity. As was noted above, without

244. See GEwIrTH, REASON, supra note 643 at 326; see also, MILL, supra note 60, at 22-63
(discussing the protection of freedom of thoughts and ideas as a way to insure that the truth
not get lost in a process of censorship).
245. See GEWMRTH, SELF-FULFHIMENT, supra note 9, at 157-58.
246. See Declaration,supra note 2.
247. GEwlRTH,SELF-FuLmumNT, supra note 9, at 157-58.

176

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 10:137

such self-esteem, his ability to achieve further goals becomes
problematic, and with it his prospects of taking satisfaction in
what he accomplishes thereby.'
The analysis suggests an important difference in the roles freedom
and autonomy perform in a human life and why mere protection of
freedom is insufficient to deal with a culture that is intolerant.
Tracing out two important aspects of freedom, negative and positive,
one can show this difference more clearly. Negative freedom is
freedom from restrictions on one's ability to act. 249 A person's
negative freedom is interfered with when a person is threatened by
the possibility of violence, discrimination, and social ostracization,
as is the case when one is shunned by their peers or family.2 50
Positive freedom is freedom to act. 1 Positive freedom is interfered
with when a person is not allowed to live life to its fullest potential
because he is not allowed to make certain decisions regarding credit,
where to live, how to entertain, or what kind of romantic relationship
to pursue. 2 Both of these forms of freedom involve outside actors.
since every freedom from is also a
Moreover, both are related
253
freedom to and vice versa.
Autonomy fits in here because autonomy is generally understood
to be self-rule. 4 That is to say, autonomy involves freedom in the
two senses mentioned above, because both are necessary for selfrule, but it also involves something more psychological. Autonomy
requires that a person have a sense of his own identity such that
any choices he makes are truly his own. 255 This is an important
concern of autonomy because a person's sense of their ability
248. Id. at 125-26.
249. See id. at. 112-13; see also Sir Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in POLITICAL
PHILoSOPHY 148 (A. Quinton ed., 1973). "[Plositive and negative freedom... One is free in the
negative sense if one is not prevented from doing something by another person." THE
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHOSOPHY 632 (Robert Audi, ed., 2d ed. 1999).
250. "One is prevented from doing something if another person makes it impossible for one
to do something or uses coercion to prevent one from doing something." THE CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 249, at 632.
251. See GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILMENT, supra note 9, at 113. "More specifically, one is free
in the positive sense to the extent that one has control over one's life, or rules oneself. In this
sense, the term is very close to that of 'autonomy'." THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 249, at 723.
252. "The forces that can prevent this self-determination are usually thought of as internal,
as desires or passions." THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 249, at 723.
This conception of freedom probably originated with Plato who saw the person as free when
the rational part of the soul ruled the spirited and appetitive parts. Id. It is also found in the
writings of Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Id.
253. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and PositiveFreedom, 36 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967).
254. See SAMAR, supra note 66, at 89; see also GEWIrTH, REASON, supra note 63, at 138.
255. GEWIrTH, SELF-FULFLMENT, supra note 9, at 115.
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to engage in self-rule may be constrained not only by external
forces, both negative and positive, but also by internal, sometimes
nonconscious, forces. These latter forces may start from a
combination of outside societal expectations, family expectations,
and religion. They become ever more insidious as they lose that
external character to become more a part of the person.2 56 It is
this factor that allows these forces to limit autonomy, as they
impose a kind of character onto a person rather than allowing the
person to develop a character more consistent with their aspirations
and goals.2 5v
Persons who are subject to such constraints may be debarred
from controlling even which desires will figure in the aspirations
they may adopt. Both their self-conceptions and their envisaged
values may thereby be severely diminished. Moreover, the desire for
autonomy may be counteracted by various fears and other
influences. You may fear the lack of external guidance and control
that comes with autonomy; and your outlook may be so dominated
by external environmental influences that you reject, or do not even
think of, your autonomy as itself a good worthy of support.2 58
Of course, one has to be careful of overgeneralizing, from a
negative societal view, that a certain lifestyle is bad or potentially
harmful to the conclusion that any devaluing of that lifestyle is
necessarily limiting of human autonomy. Certain lifestyles might
harm the individual physically or psychologically, like a lifestyle
that encourages excessive use of drugs or alcohol. If that is the case,
then attempting to limit access to such lifestyles and not promoting
them, especially to persons who might be vulnerable to its allure,
actually supports the development of individual autonomy and
purposive fulfillment. In that instance, however, there should be
sufficiently objective grounds to believe the lifestyle is harmful, and
those grounds should not be separable from the lifestyle they
disclaim. Objectively, the grounds that determine whether the
lifestyle is less worthy are similar to the grounds usually asserted
for saying chemical or psychological addictions are unhealthful,
namely, that they prevent a person from fully functioning in
important life roles unrelated to the lifestyle. For example, if a
person's alcohol or drug addiction prevents him or her from
256. See, e.g., Virgina Harris, Prisonof Color, in RACE, CLASs, GENDER, AND SEXUALrY 66
(discussing the damage African Americans do to each other's self-esteem by adopting a color
prejudice against dark skinned people).
257. See ARISrOTLE, supra note 102, bk. 3, ch. 5 (noting that it is through one's choices that
a habitual way of doing and feeling is developed).
258. See GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT, supra note 9, at 36.
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performing in his or her job or continuing in a relationship that he
or she claims to want, then such addiction would be dysfunctional
to normal life activities. By the same token, if one could seriously
argue that a lifestyle of addiction was good, it would probably be
better to honestly consider the pros and cons of such claims stacked
up against each other than to cavalierly dismiss one position just
because it goes against a standard view.2 59
My argument is partially premised on being in a cultural/social
minority and the limitations that consequently result from such
membership. Suppose, for example, an adult artist enters into a
consensual relationship with an adult seller of the drug, ecstasy, to
achieve ultimate artistic expression. Is the culture obligated to not
only allow, but to affirm this behavior? Here it would seem that the
usual criteria for not affirming a certain practice - age, harm to
others, even lack of information - may not be present. Moreover, if
my general view is correct, then to say that the artistic expression
might be obtainable in another way is not a good argument.
Otherwise, a fundamentalist Christian might say that the benefits
of a truly loving and carrying relationship might also be obtained
with a member of the opposite sex. So, how is this group identity
recognition to be handled?
This example cannot be handled with an argument similar to
what might be made by a child molester where it is fairly easy to
empirically show the psychological damage to the well-being of
the molested children. In the case of a child molester, potential
forthcoming difficulties might not be appreciated because of immature
years. Thus, it would be incorrect to say that the child was truly free
to consent. The same is not true in a different situation where both
parties fully understand the dangers associated with using ecstasy
but agree to its procurement and use anyway. In this example, the
issue is not lack of freedom, as might be manifested in a lack of
knowledge of relevant circumstances, but danger to the individual's
well-being. In the case of harmful drug use, the danger to well-being
is both physical and psychological. The serious misuse of drugs can
ultimately defeat one's ability to continue being an agent thus
ending all psychological and physical presence. In that sense, the
situation is more analogous to whether a school system should
promote students engaging in unprotected sex or to ignore that this
is going on, by refusing to allow sex education classes. Clearly, it
259. Here we find the place of an integrated role for autonomy and education where the
latter provides the necessary condition for the choices, and ultimately the character that
develops from those choices. See JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 13-42 (1922).
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would be wrong from the standpoint of preserving student wellbeing in terms of the goods of life, physical integrity and mental
equilibrium to promote such actions. This is true even if, as a strict
matter of freedom, the choice rests with the individual.
Affirming a positive view of gay and lesbian human selffulfillment would not open the door to these dangerous practices.
Rather, it would be more analogous to extolling the contributions to
culture and society at large made by persons identified as members
of a specific race, ethnic group, or religions affiliation, or as disabled.
One question still remains, especially in the context of primary and
secondary school education programs. Will the persons so addressed
be mature enough to seriously engage in such a dialogue?
If public education should treat different lifestyles positively,
it is important to determine at what point in an elementary
or secondary education it should do this. The point is not to get
the student to adopt the point of view of the teacher. Rather, the
point is to get the student to critically access all points of view on
rational grounds. The input of child and developmental psychologists
on the matter is crucial to insure that the child was ready to
understand the material in the way it was being offered. School
counselors would also need to be trained to provide helpful advice
to young people who might be in the process of coming out as
gay, lesbian, bisexual, or as having identity problems with their
physical body not being consistent with their psychological selfperspective as male or female. It is also necessary to have some
standard of selection to help our choices in selecting among what
to teach concerning various kinds of purposeful behavior. Teaching
values in a trite or superficial way, for instance, would be too easy
to either follow blindly or otherwise discard, and thus would not
add to the development of critical prowess that should be a goal of
public education.2"
In Self-Fulfillment, Gewirth offers two devices that should be
of help in solving this problem. One has already been mentioned,
namely, that the particularist morality refrain from undermining
universal morality.2"' We do not merely give into convention as to
what is right but accept those conventions only after they have been
determined not to violate universal morality. This by itself would
certainly rule out public promotion of physical and psychological
260. John Dewey, for instance, believed that a goal of education should not be to tie one to
the past but to develop those habits of mind that enable us adequately to assess new
situations and to formulate strategies for dealing with the problematic dimensions of them.
THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 249, at 198-200.
261. GEWIRTH, SELF-FULF iMENT, supra note 9, at 52-58.
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addicting situations, such as drug and alcohol use, racism, sexism,
and obvious acts of homophobia, along with various other threats
that might undermine human well-being and prevent one
from engaging in successful purposeful action.26 2 Beyond this,
however, various particularist moralities that may nonetheless
pass the universal human rights test, may only serve to promote
self-esteem to various greater or lesser extents. An example that
comes to mind is the reading of trite novels or popular culture over
serious works of literature, especially if they concern important
social topics. To handle these situations, Gewirth proposes the
Purposive Ranking Thesis.2"
That thesis operates from within a given activity, such as the
study of literature, to determine a ranking of capacities that are
likely to best fulfill the purposes of the activity. Note, that insofar
as an activity is itself harmful to human autonomy, like the
excessive use of drugs, the human rights doctrine applies directly to
deny it justification at the outset. But insofar as the activity does
not violate human rights but is also capable of operating with
different levels of human capacity fulfillment, then the Purposive
Ranking Test provides the ground for choosing the means of
performance that insure the highest capacity fulfillment consistent
with the purposes of the activity. This it does by considering three
separate components of any activity: "(a) a kind or context of
activity, (b) the purpose of that activity, and (c) the comparison or
value-ranking of capacities according to their contribution to that
purpose."2" The point is that within any activity, certain capacities
will constitute a higher order of performance in the sense of being
better able to critically unravel the truths that lie therein than
others."6 This can be ascertained from the activity's point or
purpose. So, for example, in literature, a capacity for a deeper, sociopsychological interpretation of the human condition would be
assigned a higher ranking than a more superficial, black and white,
overview. This, of course, presumes that an important purpose of
literary study is to learn more about the human condition.
Applying these concerns to what might be taught in elementary
or secondary schools about gays and lesbians, one could concede
teaching only as much about lifestyles as the students are
psychologically prepared to understand. For instance, younger
students might be taught to appreciate families with two mommies
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
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or two daddies, as well as families with both a mommy and a daddy
or a single parent, by focusing on the love and commitment to
nurturing that makes any family operate as found in various works
of literature and other sources. This follows my earlier comment
that one should take into account what children of different ages are
capable of understanding as a product of their psychological
development. One could also agree to not affirming lifestyles that
either (a) violate fundamental human rights or (b) play a more
distant role in the development of human capacity fulfillment. Thus,
one would not promote either overt expressions of homophobia in
the classroom or attempt to explain the depths of same-sex relations
only through superficial means. Here the (a) condition is set by the
PGC interpretation of the UNHRP and the (b) condition by the
Purposive Ranking Thesis. In the case of psychologically normal
adults, there would be no concern regarding psychological
development to understand the material, although there would be
a concern to meet the requirements of both universalist morality
and the Purposive Ranking Thesis, as any good university or college
curriculum illustrates
What this analysis provides is a procedure for primary and
secondary schools to follow in order to affirm individual self-esteem
and autonomy. It does this through acknowledging positive aspects
of various lifestyles and by making individuals aware of them. This
can be accomplished by including information about the sexual
orientation of some of the people whose achievements are being
studied within courses on art, history, science, and music. Perhaps
their lifestyles contributed in some interesting way to their
accomplishments. It could also be accomplished by including
information concerning the various efforts to overcome discrimination
beyond the context of race, class, and sex in courses on history and
social studies. Including in geography and cultural studies courses,
information about the way different societies have responded to
persons who were not strictly heterosexual would also add to
understanding the variety of ways in which humans have
understood and dealt with differences. Not to be left aside is the
potential of literature courses for a wide-ranging discussion of
peoples lives in many other social venues.
The analysis also provides a means for undermining aspects of
the dominant culture that may not meet either the human rights
condition or the purposive ranking thesis. Through engaging the
teaching process, the potential is increased for encouraging both
tolerance and acceptance of different peoples' lifestyles, which may
ultimately contribute to a more cooperative society at large. For
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example, older students (perhaps in a social science or sexual
orientation and the law seminar) could be encouraged to seriously
discuss and write critical papers about same-sex marriage, gay
parenting, and being out in the military, to give just a few examples.
Regardless of the positions ultimately adopted, provided the
arguments were well thought out, the well-being and self-esteem of
all concerned should be advanced. For now it would be clear that all
persons' autonomy was being respected. These discussions and
paper topics need not necessarily take place strictly in social science
classrooms either. They could also take place in courses on
literature as one reads plays and novels that might exhibit broader
social phenomena. The point in all these cases would be to let
everyone know that they have a place, especially if it is a place they
might wish to reconsider having. In this context too, having periodic
events at the school celebrating differences in sexual orientation
analogous to the ways differences in race, class, gender and
ethnicity are often celebrated, would add to the appreciation of
diversity and support a still broader notion of civic equality and
individual self-fulfillment.
One further point is worthy of mention. Even within the
limitations set, not everyone will rank the same lifestyles in the
same way. This is because different people assign different
normative weights to various purposes even in the same activity.2
Thus, even using the Purposive Ranking Thesis, a fundamentalist
Christian might see the goal of a literature class to enhance a child's
development to a certain kind of moral lifestyle. On the other hand,
a more open-ended perspective on the ends to be achieved may see
a positive discussion of alternative lifestyles as a way to encourage
a child to think for herself and to know that she is accepted
regardless of her sexual orientation. Both might seek, given their
different purposes, to develop a deeper level ofhuman understanding.
And both purposes may be honestly aimed at promoting individual
self-fulfillment.267 Yet, a question arises when the moral values of
different groups conflict: How is a school curricula to handle such
conflicts of values?
It is important to recognize a principle of civic equality to
govern when other limiting criteria have been exhausted. This may
require having a text supporting some positive aspect of an openly
gay lifestyle along with a text supporting some aspect of a more
traditional heterosexual lifestyle, perhaps the same aspect, in an
266. Id. at 71.
267. Id. at 71.
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English class. Selection would still have to be exercised as to what
texts to use, as there are different views of gay and lesbian lifestyles
within the gay community, similar to the existence of different
traditional views within the broader heterosexual community. But,
at least, choices that affect significant numbers of people could be
included. So, one could imagine reaching an agreed set of purposes
in creating classroom syllabi that would allow for a representative
grouping of different texts without any suggestion that all views
were being exhausted.2" In cases where the focus of the course
would be offset by such inclusions, perhaps because it is more
narrowly directed towards a specific educational task like in math
and science courses, the inclusion of outside information would be
more limited. Similarly, where time or economic constraints
prohibited exhaustive coverage of these matters, alternatives might
be tried. Role modeling or assigning research papers to integrate
course materials into broader social concerns, especially where a
well-stocked library is available, would alleviate economic and time
constraints. A school-sponsored outside speaker series would
alleviate misdirection of classroom attention and could, in
appropriate cases, be part of a homework assignment. This affirms
a central goal for education generally, namely, to encourage
students to develop a critical appreciation of the cross-cultural
points of view that different group identities represent. It would
also, when juxtaposed with an appropriate level of respect for one's
own ability to decide what will benefit them in the long run, lead to
increased opportunities for individual self-fulfillment. The latter,
more autonomy based outcome, can thus be seen to follow from
applying the UNHRP and Gewirth's Purposive Ranking Thesis to
the dominant particularist moralities that would otherwise be likely
to stifle the self-fulfillment of nonconforming groups.
V. FITTING WITHIN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Here we are at a good point to consider the affects of the
UNHRP and the Purposive Ranking Thesis in supporting the
outcomes that I just described via the law. Specifically, how these
two approaches can be reconciled within a democratic system like
that of the United States where equal protection is both a publicly
and judicially recognized value. At this level, it would be good to

268. The same would apply to government support for different works of art. The choice of
what to support would then be governed by the two limitations applicable for adults combined
with a principle of equality to insure a representative sampling of art works across the board.
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remember that the focus on U.S. constitutional doctrine will have
more indirect application to other democratic systems that also
affirm the value of equality. Bearing this in mind, I want to begin
by asking how the courts presently interpret the last provision of
the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. In pertinent part, the section provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.269
As a general matter, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
jurisprudence tends to follow a pattern that can be schematized as
follows. If the Court finds a violation of a fundamental right such as,
let us say, a right to privacy, then it will have a basis, on that
finding alone, to also hold that there has also been an equal
protection violation. The latter is predicated on the ground that the
violation applies to only some persons but not all.Y° In instances
where this would be the finding, the courts are inclined to strictly
construe whether the state has a compelling reason for its
distinction.2 7 1 Thus far, the Supreme Court recently found a due
process privacy right, which, in fact, is a negative right, i.e., a right
to be free from, under the U.S. Constitution for protecting the rights
of gays, lesbians, bisexuals or transgendered people. 2 Even if the
courts do not find a specific due process violation, they can still
prohibit discrimination in the application of the law on the basis of
one of three judicially recognized standards. The courts may find
that those who have traditionally been the objects of discrimination
constitute as a group a suspect class that requires laws operating
against them to be strictly construed.27' Race is one obvious instance

269. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
270. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F. 2d 699, 720 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
271. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
272. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
273. See Frontero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (where a plurality of the Court
thought for a time that gender-based discrimination might arise to the level of strict scrutiny).
As it later turned out, gender-based discrimination received heightened scrutiny. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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where this has occurred.27 4 In cases like race, the test for
determining the existence of a suspect class has been threefold:
(1) whether "the group at issue has suffered a history of
purposeful discrimination;"
(2) whether"the discrimination embodies a gross unfairness that
is sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to
term it invidious," (often indicated by a lack of relationship to
ability, unique disabilities based on prejudice or inaccurate
stereotypes, and defined by an immutable characteristic [which
may not be truly unchangeable but just very hard to change];
and,
(3) whether "the group burdened by official discrimination lacks
the political power necessary to obtain redress from the political
branches of government." 275
In Watkins v. United States Army,276 Judge Norris argued that gays
and lesbians meet the requirements of the above test, 7 although
his rationale was reversed by an en banc panel for the 9th Circuit
that court held for Watkins on narrower grounds. 8
Alternatively, in a future case, the Supreme Court might find
that gays and lesbians warrant an intermediate level of protection
on the ground that much of the discrimination directed against
them is founded on gender.2 7 9 The test is whether the government

can show the distinction between men and women, in a particular
context, serves "important governmental objectives" and is
"substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' ° The
weakest analysis a court will allow in respect to an equal protection
challenge is whether a particular statute or administrative
274. Notwithstanding the specific holding in Korematsu, and given a district court's
subsequent finding that the government withheld critical information from the Court when
the decision to inturn persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast was made during
World War 2, Korematsu today can be read "to 'stand' for the proposition that statutes that
facially discriminate against racial minorities are almost always urjust and unconstitutional"
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601 (Goeffrey

R. Stone et al., 3d ed. 1996).
275. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
666 (1997).
276. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F. 2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
277. Id. at 1345-49.
278. Watkins, 875 F.2d, at 709 (1989).
279. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996).
280. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Here it might be noted that "the Court's
skeptical attitude toward such justifications [as are usually provided with regard to gender]
reflects a willingness to scrutinize apparent public values to see whether they are in fact the
product of raw political power." Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1713 (1984).
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regulation or procedure has a rational basis tied to a legitimate
governmental concern.i Here the test is whether the different
treatment of the groups is relevant to a difference between them
that is also related to the legitimate state goal.282 This test is weak
because almost any reason the government puts forth will meet this
standard.2" However, even here there has been nudging.2" The
Supreme Court has distinguished different levels of rational relation
depending on the objective being sought. This suggests that certain
governmental objectives, like preventing individuals from seeking
the protection of the law via anti-discrimination ordinances and
statutes, cannot be legitimate.'
Given that the above provides a general schematic for equal
protection analysis, the next question is how promoting individual
self-fulfillment, as this article has been suggesting, might fit within
the constitutional doctrine. Here we see the significance of the
difference of focus between the negative and positive types of
freedom that the UNHRP promotes as compared to that supported
by traditional equal protection analysis, which tends to be more
(although perhaps not exclusively) of only the negative type. From
that difference arises a normative argument based on the nature of
society and liberalism that suggests at least a partial revision of the
constitutional norms respecting current equal protection analysis.
That normative argument is as follows: In the case of traditional
equal protection analysis, the state is prohibited from arbitrary
discrimination. Before the state can make distinctions in the
provision of goods or services, including all the benefits of the law,
it must have a reason capable of satisfying the particular degree of
scrutiny, mentioned above, that the courts have recognized to be
applicable for the group in question. Put another way, the freedom
of the individuals who make up the particular groups is protected
from imposition of an arbitrary classification scheme. In this
281. See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); see also J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: ATHEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 145-48(1980), pp. 145-48; Sunstein,

supra note 280, at 1713.
282. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 274, at 567.

283. See id. at 561.
284. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Court held that
a Texas city's refusal to permit construction of a group home for the mentally retarded
violated the minimal scrutiny requirement of equal protection since it was based on prejudice.
285. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). Justice Kennedy's opinion states: "I1f the
constitutional conception of'equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest" (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
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respect, the groups are free to seek self-fulfillment without the law
serving as a kind of albatross about their necks.
Two important examples of where the state has failed to set an
appropriate justification for discrimination are Brown v. Board of
2 87 In Brown, the Court brought
Education2 and Loving v. Virginia.
to an end the era of legal protection for state laws allowing so-called
"separate but equal" public education for racial minorities. In Plessy
v. Ferguson, the Court had previously upheld a Louisiana statute
that provided for equal but separate accommodations for the white
and colored races, on board a railroad train, on the ground that the
fourteenth amendment was not intended to abolish all color-based
distinctions or to enforce social as distinguished from political
equality.2"' That era of "separate but equal," however, came to an
end when, in Brown, the Court took note of important social science
data that showed how separation of school children by race was
inherently unequal."' The Court noted that education was crucial
to the performance of our most basic responsibilities, including
service in the armed forces, as a foundation of good citizenship and
as an instrument to awakening the child to cultural values and
professional training.' When children were separated on the basis
of race, it evoked in them an "inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." 1 Ironically, the Court noted this negative
impact on the children's psychology by citing the lower court's
finding that had supported separate but equal public education.
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction
of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial ly] integrated
2
system.1
school

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.l1.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id.
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In effect, the Court found that the separation of the races denied
each child the freedom to participate fully and in a self-fulfilling
way in a democratic society. By putting to one side the particularist
moral thinking that had predicated constitutional interpretation
since Plessy, the Court in Brown was able to see in light of the social
science data available that "separate but equal" was inherently
unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional.2 93 In its place, the Court
adopted a new principle that all children in public schools must be
given the opportunity for an education on equal terms.29 4
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court considered whether
a Virginia miscegenation statute violated the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide both due process and equal
protection of the laws.295 As noted by Cass Sunstein, the difference
between fourteenth amendment due process jurisprudence and
equal protection jurisprudence is that the former is backward
looking while the latter is forward looking.2" That being said, the
challenge for the due process clause is whether "an existing or timehonored convention, described at the appropriate level of generality"
has been violated.29 7 Whereas the challenge for the equal protection
clause is "to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time
of its ratification and that were expected to endure."29 s In Loving,
the Court held that the statute violated both clauses noting that,
with respect to the equal protection clause, "mere 'equal application'
of a statute containing racial classifications would not be enough to
remove it from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription" against
race-based classifications.2 9 9 To the contrary, the Court considered
whether the statute itself, including the institution of marriage as
was therein created and described, could pass constitutional muster.
In holding that it could not, the Court noted that:
[t]here can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race.
The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in
by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has
consistently repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry" as being"odious to a free people whose
293. Id. at 495.
294. See id. at 493.
295. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
296. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Processand Equal Protection,55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
297. Id. at 1163.
298. Id.
299. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
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institutions are founded upon a doctrine of equality.".. . The fact
that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy .... Marriage is one of those "basic
civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and
survival. . . The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations."°
Following these statements the Court held that "the [negative]
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."30'
Contrasting this negative freedom approach of traditional equal
protection analysis is the positive freedom focus suggested in
Palmore v. Sidoti. °2 Because I am already suggesting that this
positive freedom focus is a subtle part of existing equal protection
law, the point to be made here has more to do with emphasis than
finding something distinctly different from previous case law
analysis. In Palmore, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether a state court's judgment to divest a natural
mother of custody of her infant child in favor of the natural father
following her remarriage to member of a different race violated the
Equal Protection Clause." 3 In finding that it did, the Court stated
that:
[t]he question, however, is whether the reality of private biases
and the possible injury they may inflict are permissible
considerations for the removal of an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty
concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases
may be outside of the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect .... The effects of racial
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification
removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother
found to be an appropriate person to have such custody."°4
On the surface, this case sounds like a standard negative
freedom treatment of equal protection analysis as it restricts the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 433.
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state from interfering with the mother's right to have custody of her
child because of her remarriage to a person of another race.
However, given that this case involves a choice of custody between
parents where there is no claim of unfitness, the standard that
usually applies in such matters is for the courts to choose the
placement that represents the best interest of the child. If that is
the case, then buried beneath the text of the decision is the idea that
continuing the placement of a child in an interracial home must not
be contrary to the child's best interest. Stated differently, the
freedom that the equal protection clause is protecting here is the
positive freedom of the child to obtain the best placement among the
contending parents. This is an important positive freedom aspect of
the case, although perhaps one that has not been fully appreciated,
even though it is the aspect that appears to have been anticipated
by the New Jersey Superior Court's decision in M.P. v. S.F. 3 5
In M.P., we have a similar custody fight following a divorce and
award of custody of two children to the natural mother.3" Only now
the basis of the fight was not the interracial remarriage of the
mother but that the mother admitted to being a practicing
homosexual." 7 Noting that "[iut is well settled that the best interests
of the child are of primary concern to the court in any matter
involving custody of minor children,"' the court reversed the lower
court's change of placement and reinstated the original placement
of the children back with the mother. Key to the court's holding was
its finding that
[tiaking the children from defendant [mother] can be done
only at the cost of sacrificing those very qualities they will find
most sustaining in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead.
Instead of forbearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will
foster in them a sense of shame for their mother. Instead of
courage and the precept that people of integrity do not shrink
from bigots, it counsels the easy option of shirking difficult
problems and following the course of expedience. Lastly, it
diminishes their regard for the rule of human behavior,
everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those to whom we
are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held
in low esteem by others. 3°9

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

M.P. v. S. P., 404 A.2d 1256, 169 N. J. Super. 425 (1979).
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
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Juxtaposing Palmore with M.P. v. S.P., the two cases can be
read to stand for the proposition that even a majority group's vocal
dissent cannot offset the self-fulfillment of a minority group absent
a very strong (and in the context of a fundamental right, compelling)
reason for doing so. And, assuming M.P. v. S.P. is not too far off
from what is going on in Palmore,there is no heckler's veto that the
courts are willing to sustain to credit the "harm" inflicted on an
inter-racially placed child and, in New Jersey and some other states,
on a same-sex placement. So, the question now arises, if federal
equal protection allows for the possibility of protecting the positive
freedom of a minority group to achieve self-fulfillment against an
adamant dissenting majority group, how might this analysis of the
case law be furthered by also bringing in the UTNHRP?
As described above, the UNHRP provides not only that the
freedom and well being of every person be protected, but also that
the goods that constitute this freedom, namely, the basic,
nonsubtractive and additive goods that sustain a self-fulfilled life,
be publicly recognized. Here we note an important point about the
nature of the equality that the equal protection clause protects.
Contra the view that the Equal Protection Clause protects only
procedural or appetitive equality,31 the case law under the
interpretative analysis I have suggested shows that the equal
protection clause is ripe for protecting "necessary rights that all
31
humans must have, simply by virtue of being purposive agents." '
In saying this, the UNHRP recognizes a norm to be able to develop
one's capacity to the fullest extent possible as a kind of personal
property that the individual is "entitled to have and control for her
own sake."3 12 But recognizing that limited resources will prevent all
capacities from being developed or developed fully, the UNHRP
requires at the very least that these capacities not fail to be
developed because a dominant negative cultural influence against
a particular minority group is pervasively non-addressed through
the public education system. Especially with respect to the public
310. Procedural equality occurs when one treats like cases alike without regard to what
benefit or detriment is distributed provided when everyone is treated in the same way.
Vincent J. Samar, Symposium: "Family' and the Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgendered People (LGBT): Gay Rights as a ParticularInstantiation of
Human Rights, 64 ALB. L. REv 983, 1028 (2001). Appetitive equality occurs where one treats
others as one would want to be treated. Id. The problem with the former is that same-sex
sodomy could be prohibited to all people by virtue of it being a general rule even though its
effect would be most prominent on less than all people. Id. The problem with the latter view
is that one can forgo for themselves rights that others may want perhaps because they have
been so conditioned to believe that they have no legitimate claim to such rights. Id.
311. Id.
312. GE nRmT,SELF-FULnju.ENT, supra note 9, at 85.
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education of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender youth, effective
possession and control of one's own self-esteem will not be possible
if one lives in a society where the dominant culture diminishes one's
status and activities where there is no obvious harm to oneself or
others. By refusing both to grant recognition to the positive
contributions made by gay people or to encourage open discussions
about cultural norms, the state becomes complicit in trivializing gay
persons and contributing to negative stereotypes about them, which
has the effect, both directly and indirectly, of limiting this group.
For these reasons, the UNHRP by its interpretative capacity
emboldens the federal Equal Protection Clause, and arguably state
equal protection clauses as well, to meet this challenge. It does this
by providing a lens with which to interpret the equal protection
clause to affirm human capacity fulfillment wherever possible so as
to maximize the possibility of human aspirations. Especially, in the
context of public education where neutrality is a mere euphemism
for affirming the particularist morality of the dominant cultural
group, the UNHRP requires not just tolerance but a bold and
enlivening response.
CONCLUSION

Since every society will promote a set of cultural values
customarily, if not legally, it becomes very important to determine
what the role of public education should be in adjudicating among
different values. This is the case especially where people's selfesteem may be at stake and the dominant culture is less than
neutral in its devaluation of the self-esteem of certain groups. In
this essay, I have suggested several criteria for how public
education might be effectively used to promote the self-fulfillment
of gay and lesbian youth. In doing so, I hope that I have opened the
door to government not being perfectly neutral in the affirmance of
various lifestyles through the provision of public education. I also
hope that I have placed adequate limitations on exactly what
government can do so as not simply to replace one dominant
cultural viewpoint with another. My ultimate goal is that in all such
situations, human dignity should be maintained by insuring that
the necessary elements for individuals to discover the best way to
achieve self-fulfillment are consciously provided. If this means
recognizing the best aspects of various group identities, as survives
the constraints imposed by the requirements of the UNHRP and
Purposive Ranking Thesis, then this is exactly what must be done.
Provided these steps are taken, any society, especially a democratic
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one, should be able to flourish with the knowledge that all its
members' chances for full self-fulfillment are adequately provided.

